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5 June 1984

USSR REPORT
MILITARY AFFAIRS

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No 3, March 1984

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COMMAND OF COALITION ARMED FORCES IN WORLD WAR II COMPARED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 84 (signed to press 24 Feb 84) pp 27-34

[Article by Army Gen A. Gribkov, chief of staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact States: "In the Command and Control of Coalition Troop Groupings"]

[Text] World War II of 1939-1945, in being prepared for and initiated by international imperialism with German Nazism being the main attack force, was a coalition war. Engaged in it, on the one side, were the states of the anti-Hitler coalition where the Soviet Union represented the decisive force, and on the other, the Nazi military bloc headed by Nazi Germany.

The war showed that control and command over the coalition troop groupings was a very complex problem since the choice of the most acceptable forms and methods of directing the armed struggle was closely tied to a consideration of numerous factors of a political, economic and specifically military nature. An important role was also played by the national features of the allied armies.

This problem has become even more acute in our times, when the largest military-political alliances which have ever existed in the world--the Warsaw Pact and NATO--have been established and oppose one another. For this reason a new war, if the imperialists succeed in initiating it against the socialist commonwealth countries, will be waged by larger coalition troop groupings, with the most decisive aims and a maximum straining of all forces. Success in such a war will depend upon numerous factors, including on the art of controlling the allied troops and naval forces. As a consequence of this, a study of the experience of World War II on this question is not only of theoretical but also great practical significance.

In the course of the war, various forms of coalition leadership developed and these clearly reflected the essential differences between the warring coalitions. While the Nazi military bloc which had been founded on the "Anti-Comintern Pact" concluded in 1936 and later developing into a military alliance of Germany, Italy and Japan, had a frankly aggressive nature, the anti-Hitler coalition developed only in the course of World War II. Its formation was dictated by the pressing need to bring together the efforts of the various countries and peoples in the fight against Nazism which threatened the liberty

and progressive development of all mankind. An important feature of the anti-Hitler coalition was the fact that it, for the first time in history, actually showed the possibility of fruitful collaboration between states with different social systems not only in peacetime but also in an armed struggle against a common enemy. This is of important significance both now and in the future.

Of course, one cannot help but point out that the methods of directing the armed forces of the member states in the anti-Hitler coalition were markedly influenced by the fact that the political line of the USSR frequently clashed with the line of certain circles in the Western states which were endeavoring to subordinate the conduct of the war and the resolving of postwar problems to their imperialist interests. But, regardless of this and due to the flexible and far-sighted foreign policy activities of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, it was possible to achieve close collaboration between the USSR, the United States and England and to find the most effective forms for those specific historical conditions for coalition leadership over the armed struggle.

The basic form for coordinating military efforts by the participants of the anti-Hitler coalition was inter-Allied conferences for the heads of state of the USSR, the United States and England. Participating in the work of the conferences were the ministers of foreign affairs and the chiefs of the general staffs, economic and diplomatic advisors and experts. The personal correspondence between the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, the U.S. President and the British Prime Minister was of great importance for unifying the efforts of the Allied armed forces.

The resolving of major questions of a political, strategic and economic nature was also achieved by bilateral meetings of heads of states with the participation of representatives from the armed forces, the ministries of foreign affairs and various advisors.

In the system of coalition leadership, a prominent place was given over to the activities of the military missions through which constant contact was maintained between the Soviet Command and the armed forces of the Western Allies. The military missions informed their commands on the course of military operations, they supervised the carrying out of military deliveries by the Allies and participated in their organizing. The mission members made trips to the fronts where, in the field, they became acquainted with the situation. Information was also provided by the exchanging of telegrams between the Allied general staffs. For coordinating individual questions and exchanging experience there was also the practice of the reciprocal posting of entrusted representatives.

The immediate coordinating of the operations of the armed forces was carried out by the superior staffs and other responsible bodies of the Allied countries on the basis of agreement between the governments. In particular, at the Tehran Conference held at the end of 1943 it was decided that the military staffs of the three states "should henceforth maintain close contact with one another over the question of the pending operations in Europe."¹

As a result of the agreement reached between the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and the representatives of the U.S. High Command, in 1944, "shuttle

operations" were organized and carried out for American aviation utilizing the Soviet airfields. At the same time, the Soviet Air Forces and Anglo-American aviation began to make joint raids against groupings of Nazi troops. For this the parties agreed to establish a demarkation line the crossing of which was strictly prohibited. Agreement was also reached on the combat areas and link-up lines of the Allied troops as well as certain measures of an administrative nature.

Thus, regardless of the lack of a constantly operating body for joint military leadership of all the Allied countries, and due to the forms of coordinating actions worked out in the course of the war, the arising problems of directing armed combat were basically successfully solved. At the same time, one cannot help but emphasize that the duplicity and insincerity in the conduct of the leadership of the United States and particularly Great Britain frequently complicated a settling of questions related to coordinating Allied operations. Clear proof of this was the extended delay in opening a second front in Europe by Western Allies. Its true goals were disclosed at one time by the former U.S. Secretary of Defense Stimson. "Not to open a strong Western Front on time," he wrote, "meant to shift the entire burden of the war onto Russia."²

Valuable experience in coalition leadership was also gained in the course of joint military operations by the USSR Armed Forces and the armies of the countries participating in operations on the Soviet-German Front and in the Near East, in the concluding stage of the war.

The common aims in the struggle against the Nazi invaders and the broad involvement in this of the patriotic forces in the vanguard of which were the communist and worker parties of a number of European countries created a sound political basis for new forms of relations between the Allied armies. Leadership over the armed struggle was provided by the Soviet government and Headquarters Supreme High Command [Hq SHC] under agreement with the governments and superior military bodies of Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Mongolia. The military formations of these countries maintained independence on the questions of internal life, organization and logistics.

The temporary operational subordination of the units, formations and field forces of the Allied armies to the Soviet Command was the basic method of leadership and control over the coalition troop groups. Fighting as part of the Soviet fronts were two Polish armies and a separate tank corps, a Czechoslovak army corps, two Romanian armies and one Bulgarian army as well as a number of other national formations. In the aim of closer cooperation in the course of the operations, the Allied formations were often put under operational subordination to the commanders of Soviet armies. Thus, the First Romanian Army was in operational terms under the 53d Army and the 4th Romanian Army under the 27th Army.

There also was the setting up of operational groups of Allied troops headed by Soviet commanders. Such a form of cooperation contributed to the achieving of coordinated actions and to increasing the combat capabilities of the Allied troop formations by bringing in Soviet artillery and other weapons to their zones, it made it easier for them to master the combat experience of the Soviet Army and served to strengthen combat friendship.

In the course of operations, the commanders of the Allied troops and their staffs gained definite experience in coordinating the actions of the Allied troops. This was achieved in the process of the joint elaboration of operational plans and personal meetings of the commanders-in-chief, the commanders and their representatives as well as leaders of military missions. A characteristic example in this regard was the elaboration of the plan for the 1944 Belgrad Operation. Participating in the operation were troops of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The questions of their joint actions were discussed at a meeting of the command of the Third Ukrainian Front with the commander-in-chief of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, J. Broz Tito, and a representative of the Bulgarian Command. Fundamental questions of the use of Bulgarian troops on the Soviet-German Front were also settled at a meeting in November 1944 of the commander of the Third Ukrainian Front and the head of the government of the Bulgarian Fatherland Front.

In determining the missions for the Allied troops, thorough consideration was given to their combat capabilities, to the experience of conducting military operations, to the state of troop morale, to the organizing of supply as well as to the particular features related to the national character of one or another army. The Soviet Command gave great attention to the proposals from the leadership of the Allied troops for the operations being prepared and also helped it in taking effective decisions. Along with setting combat missions for the Allied troops, the operational directives contained specific recommendations on carrying them out.

In the aim of coordinating joint actions in the course of the operations between the cooperating commanders and staffs, a direct link was maintained, information was exchanged and meetings were held by the representatives of the Allied troops. Of important significance was the personal contact by the commanders of the Soviet field forces with the command of the Allied troops. For example, Mar SU F. I. Tolbukhin repeatedly met with the command of the 1st Bulgarian Army in the positions of its troops as well as at the front's staff.

The successful carrying out of tasks to ensure cooperation among the Allied troops to a large degree depended upon the well organized and coordinated work of the missions. In accord with the achieved agreements, on the staffs of the field forces and formations of the Polish and Czechoslovak armed forces there were representatives of the Soviet Command, the General Staff and advisors. Operations groups were sent out to the Romanian armies, corps and divisions as well as to the staffs of the Bulgarian armies and military advisors worked in the Bulgarian formations. The activities of all these officials and groups consisted primarily in providing aid in organizing combat, ensuring command and control of the troops, achieving a unified understanding of the common combat missions and maintaining close cooperation in the course of the operation .

The maintaining of troop cooperation was also aided by the presence of Romanian and Bulgarian operations groups under the staffs of the corresponding fronts. The military missions from the friendly countries assigned to the staffs of Soviet formations also played an important role in ensuring a unity of understanding for the operational missions. The activities of the Soviet military missions were of great importance in coordinating the efforts of different nationality troops.

The experience of controlling the Allied troop groupings was added to in the course of the combat operations to defeat the Kwantung Army in 1945. Positive results were achieved by establishing a combined Soviet-Mongolian Command for the combined cavalry-mechanized group as well as the operational groups of Soviet and Mongolian officers for jointly working out combat documents, for supervising the fulfillment of orders and instructions and ensuring cooperation.

The war showed the high effectiveness of the employed forms and methods for coordinating the joint efforts of the Soviet Army, the armies of the fraternal European countries and Mongolia. A positive aspect in the leadership of the Allied troops was the coordinating of plans for strategic operations with the governments and superior military command of the friendly countries as well as consideration of their requests and proposals. Due to this unity of actions by the Allies was achieved in the fight against the common enemy. Military collaboration was developed and strengthened between the Allied countries on the principles of proletarian internationalism.

The methods of leading the armed forces of the Western states which were members of the anti-Hitler coalition (the United States, England, France and other bourgeois countries) had a fundamentally different nature. These bore the imprint of many contradictions which existed between these countries. The experience of the first period of World War II showed that the system of coalition leadership established by England and France could not bring about the pooling of efforts in the area of the strategic utilization of the armed forces and became one of the reasons for the defeat of the Anglo-French troops in 1940.

In the interests of resolving the basic problems in U.S. and English strategy at the beginning of 1942 a higher, permanent military body for coalition leadership was set up with headquarters in Washington. This was the Joint Committee of Chiefs of Staff. The committee participated in working out important problems for conducting the armed struggle, it defined the plans for strategic operations and established the procedure for logistical support of the troops in the theaters of military operations. Moreover, it examined and proved the plans for conducting operations in the theaters and supervised their execution.

The experience of the war showed the viability of this coalition command body which played a positive role in planning and coordinating combat operations, particularly in preparing and conducting offensive operations by the Allied Armed Forces in Western Europe.

The Allied joint commands provided leadership over the joint actions of the various U.S. and British armed services in the theaters of war. A characteristic example of the organizing of coalition leadership in the theater of war was the establishing and activity of a joint command during the invasion of the Allied troops of Northern France. The American general D. Eisenhower was appointed the commander-in-chief of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in the Western European Theater of War and he was given the responsibility for preparing and carrying out the operation. Under him were all the assigned ground, sea and air forces with the exception of the strategic aviation. The English Chief Air Mar A. Tedder was the deputy commander-in-chief. A staff of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in Europe (subsequently the Supreme Staff) was also

formed. Under it were representatives from the staffs of other nations including France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Among the questions which were the concern of the staff, the primary ones were long-range planning of operations after troop landings on the continent as well as administrative and house-keeping questions. In the staff's activities, an important place was given to resolving problems of a political and diplomatic nature.

The plans for the individual campaigns and operations were examined at conferences of the U.S. and English heads of state with participation by members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. On the basis of the instructions of the Committee, the commander-in-chief in the theater of war planned the operations and directed the actions of all the Allied armed services in the theater. In accord with the plan of the commander-in-chief for the operation, a directive was worked out which set out the tasks for the groups of armies, as well as the Allied navies and air forces.

Coalition leadership was often carried out in a situation of sharp differences of opinion and clashes of different viewpoints by the Allies over major questions of policy and strategy. This was a serious obstacle for taking coordinated decisions and told negatively on the conduct of the campaigns and operations and on the organizing of cooperation. In a desire to achieve primarily their own political and strategic goals, the United States and England did not always consider the interests of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces which were bearing the basic burden of the fight against Nazi Germany.

However, as experience showed, the organization and methods employed by the United States and England in commanding the coalition troop groupings in the course of World War II, regardless of the presence of contradictions between the Allies, basically ensured the carrying out of a larger portion of the missions confronting their armed forces.

As for the methods of the command of troops in the Nazi bloc, they basically corresponded to the nature of the relations between its participants. The leadership of military operations was concentrated in the hands of Nazi Germany and militaristic Japan as the strongest states in the coalition. The coordinating of strategic tasks was carried out at conferences of representatives from these countries as well as by military commissions and delegations and special military missions which had broad powers. There was also a constant exchange of military-political information, intelligence and other data. However, the nations of the bloc were unable to achieve complete cooperation in resolving questions of concentrating military efforts.

In the coalition cooperation of Germany and Italy the dominant role was played by the Nazi military-political leadership which did not trust its "junior partner" and showed a disdainful attitude to it. The formations and field forces of Fascist Italy which were fighting together with the German troops in North Africa and on the Soviet-German Front were actually in direct subordination to the German Command.

The same principle was used in leading the armed forces of the other European countries in the Nazi coalition. For coordinating common efforts, German military missions were sent to them and under the Supreme Command the position of

"German general" was established and the troops of the ally country were actually under his command. In particular, this was the case in Romania and Hungary. Instructions on the questions of the conduct of combat were given directly to the chiefs of the general staffs of the bloc's member nations directly at Hitler's headquarters. The field forces and formations of the armed forces of the Nazi coalition which were on the Soviet-German Front were incorporated in the German army groups and fought in zones assigned to them by the Wehrmacht leadership.

A characteristic feature in the leadership over the armed forces of the allies of Nazi Germany as its defeat approached was the complete concentrating of control over them in the hands of the German Military Command. For example, during the Iasi-Kishinev Operation of 1944, the German Command, mistrusting the Romanians, positioned the Romanian formations between German units while the XXIX Romanian Corps which occupied the most crucial area of the defenses was under the command of a German general.⁴

The coordinating of military-political questions, including the use of the armed forces of the puppet states set up on the Japanese-occupied territory, was basically carried out at conferences and meetings. There was no coalition command over the Allied troops. They, as a rule, were directly under the Japanese Command.

Thus, the main feature in the settling of questions concerning troop command in the Nazi-militaristic bloc was the actual elimination by the German and Japanese military leadership of their partners from participating in coordinating troop operations and the imposing of terms and discrimination against their allies. This caused their dissatisfaction and contributed to the further breakdown and collapse of this bloc.

As a whole, an analysis of the experience of the command of coalition troop groupings during the years of World War II shows the indisputable advantage of the forms and methods of coalition collaboration employed by the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition over the leadership style of the Nazi military bloc. It is also essential to point out the positive experience gained by the fraternal armies in the process of coordinating the reciprocal efforts of the Soviet Armed Forces and the armies of the countries which participated in military operations on the Soviet-German and Soviet-Japanese Fronts.

A characteristic feature in the coalitions from the period of World War II was a clearly expressed tendency within them for groups of states pursuing common political and military-strategic goals to come together. These were regional military alliances such as Germany and its satellites in the war against the USSR; the United States, Great Britain and other Western states in Europe; the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the other Eastern European states; the USSR and Mongolia.

World War II showed the increased role and importance of military-political coalitions which brought together scores of different countries with their millions of population. Undoubtedly in a future war, if the imperialists succeed in starting it, the role of coalitions will grow even more. In such a war, primarily the achieving of unity in the political and military-strategic views of

the allies can be the basis for successfully resolving the questions of coalition leadership.

This, in particular, has been a constant focus for all the efforts of the Warsaw Pact which is the main coordinating center for the activities of its members. The unity of the military and strategic views of the socialist commonwealth states is based upon common goals and will of the fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties on the questions of the construction of socialism and communism and the defense of socialist victories and peace. On this level our defense-political alliance has indisputable advantages over the imperialist blocs.

Considering the experience of the previous war, the leadership of the aggressive NATO bloc is also working for unity in political and military-strategic views. This line is carried out by imposing the official U.S. strategic doctrines and concepts on the other members of the NATO bloc to the detriment of their national interests.

The war years clearly demonstrated the dominant role of the centralized resolving of questions related to command of coalition troops. In the postwar period this has undergone further development. Obviously, in the future, a similar trend will prevail. The combat capability of the armed forces of one or another coalition to a significant degree will be determined by the state of the constantly developing and improving unified system of command and control which has been set up ahead of time in peacetime and conforms fully to the present development level of the means and forms of armed combat.

This shows a fundamentally new direction in the development of the theory and practice of military coalitions and coalition wars.

The experience of the last war showed the particular importance of organizing close cooperation among the coalition troops in carrying out combat missions. With good reason among the NATO leadership the problems of coordination of the joint and national commands have caused the greatest concern and because of this extensive work has been done to improve this. The basic efforts have been directed at the advance setting of the procedure and dates for transferring the troops to the NATO Command, the assigning of spheres of responsibility among the joint and national command bodies and the resolving of other command questions.

Great attention is also given to cooperation in the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces. This is expressed primarily in the working out of coordinated documents which regulate the procedure for the joint actions of the troops, aviation and navies, the organizing of dependable communications between the co-operating staffs, the exchanging of operations groups and liaison officers between the command bodies and the organizing of reciprocal information on the situation. The questions of cooperation are worked on constantly in all the joint exercises conducted.

As the experience of the previous war and military cooperation among the socialist commonwealth armies has shown, in improving the command of the Allied troops the use of the principles of Marxist-Leninist military science is of

exceptionally important significance. This helps not only to disclose the overall patterns of modern warfare but also to predict probable changes in its nature and content, to determine the forms and methods for preparing and conducting joint operations and to bring out effective methods for leading the allied troops.

A profound and thorough study by the military personnel of the fraternal armies of the questions of command of coalition troop groupings in operations, the elaboration of recommendations and their introduction into the actual work of the leadership of the allied troops and staffs will help to further strengthen combat might and to increase combat readiness of the Joint Armed Forces, a powerful factor for peace and a secure shield of the socialist commonwealth.

FOOTNOTES

¹ "Sovetskiy Soyuz na mezhdunarodnykh konferentsiyakh perioda Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945 gg." [The Soviet Union at International Conferences from the Period of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Vol II, Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, p 24.

² "Istoriya vnesheiny politiki SSSR 1917-1966 gg., chast' pervaya (1917-1945 gg.)" [History of the USSR Foreign Policy of 1917-1966, Part 1 (1917-1945)], Moscow, Nauka, 1966, p 402.

³ See: "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 12, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1982, pp 348-350.

⁴ See: M. M. Minasyan, "Osvobozhdeniye narodov Yugo-Vostochnoy Evropy" [Liberation of the Peoples of Southeast Europe], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1967, p 111.

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LESSONS OF INITIAL PERIOD OF WORLD WAR II EXAMINED

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[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, Maj Gen V. Matsulenko: "Certain Conclusions from the Experience of the Initial Period of the Great Patriotic War"]

[Text] Having treacherously violated the nonaggression treaty, Nazi Germany at the dawn of 22 June 1941 suddenly initiated a war against the Soviet Union. Its aviation made massed raids on airfields, the rail junctions and a number of major cities. As a result of the overwhelming superiority in forces created by Nazi Command in the sectors of the main thrusts, the tank and motorized formations of Army Groups North and Center by the end of the first day of the war had succeeded in advancing to a depth of 35 km, in places up to 50 km, while the advanced units of Army Group South had made 10-20 km.

For the troops in the first echelon and the armies of the second strategic echelon being moved up from the interior, the Soviet High Command at the end of June set the task of preparing a system of defensive zones and lines on the sectors where the basic enemy efforts were concentrated and in relying on these by stubborn and active resistance to defeat the enemy, to halt its further advance and gain time for preparing a counteroffensive.¹

The Soviet troops, showing exceptional courage, valor and mass heroism, in the defensive engagements caused serious losses to the enemy. In mid-June, the offensive of the Nazi hordes in the Baltic and on the Leningrad and Kiev axes had slowed down extremely while on the central sector the enemy had been engaged in extended battles in the area of Smolensk. The plans of the Nazi Command to cross the Dnepr without a halt and advance unobstructed against Moscow, Leningrad and the Donets Basin had collapsed. However, in benefiting from the surprise of the attack and numerical superiority in new military equipment and weapons, the enemy troops in the first 3 weeks were able to advance up to 400-450 km in the northwestern sector, from 450 to 600 km in the western and up to 300-350 km in the southwestern. They had captured Latvia, Lithuania, a significant portion of the Ukraine, Belorussia and Moldavia, they had invaded the western oblasts of the Russian Federation and had arrived at the distant approaches to Leningrad.²

In this situation, the Soviet Command committed in the basic sectors the major strategic reserves comprising the second strategic echelon to battle. A new stage began in the summer-autumn campaign of 1941.

The basic content of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War was the conducting of intense defensive operations by the troops in the first strategic echelon of the Soviet Armed Forces and the carrying out of primary party and state measures by the Communist Party and Soviet government to mobilize and develop the military, economic and moral-political potentials of the state. A general mobilization was carried out, the strategic reserves established in peacetime were moved up from the interior of the nation and committed to battle, the economy was converted to a wartime footing, the party and state apparatus was reorganized in accord with the war's requirements and a series of diplomatic acts was carried out aimed at establishing favorable foreign policy conditions for conducting the armed struggle.

In a short period of time, a program was worked out and began to be carried out for converting the state to a wartime status and for mobilizing all the forces of the people to fight the enemy. This program was set out in the Directive of the USSR SNK [Council of People's Commissars] and the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee of 29 June 1941. In working this out the Central Committee was guided by the instructions of V. I. Lenin that for victory over the enemy the nation had to be converted into a united military camp and that "everything should be subordinate to the interests of the war, all internal life of the nation should be subordinate to the war and not even the slightest vacillation on this question permitted."³

Military mobilizational work and the greatest possible strengthening of the Soviet Army and Navy became the main thing in the activities of the Communist Party. The Central Committee pointed to the necessity of immediately reorganizing the work of the rear services, converting the entire national economy to a wartime footing and increasing the output of military products.

All the party's ideological work was subordinate to carrying out the task of defeating the enemy. The activities of the party organizations were aimed at increasing discipline and combat capability of the troops, at strengthening their morale, explaining to the people the just nature of the Great Patriotic War, reminding them of the sacred duty of each Soviet person to defend the motherland, and at indoctrinating courage and heroism on the front and a desire for unstinting labor in the rear. Particularly important significance was given to indoctrinating Soviet patriotism, to strengthening the friendship of the Soviet peoples and to propagandizing the great principles of proletarian internationalism.

At the outset of the war, the leadership bodies of the Armed Forces and the national economy were reorganized. In the aim of combining the efforts of the front and the rear and for rapidly carrying out crucial decisions, on 30 June the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the VKP(b) Central Committee and the USSR SNK organized the State Defense Committee (GKO) under the chairmanship of I. V. Stalin. All power in the nation was concentrated in the hands of the GKO. By a decree of the USSR SNK and the VKP(b) Central Committee, on 23 June the Headquarters of the High Command was organized and on 10 July this was renamed

Headquarters of the Supreme Command and on 8 August, Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. In the cities in the zone of the front which were threatened with the danger of enemy capture, city defense committees were organized headed by the first secretaries of the party obkoms and gorkoms.

The initial period of the Great Patriotic War was the most difficult in the struggle of the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany. As a consequence of the unfavorably developing circumstances, the Soviet Armed Forces were forced to fight under disadvantageous conditions. The consequences of this period for an extended time determined the nature of the armed struggle on the Soviet-German Front.

The irreconcilable class nature of the commenced war and the uncompromising aims pursued by the belligerents determined the enormous scope and extreme fierceness of the military operations. By massed air strikes and by deep breakthroughs of large groupings of mobile troops, the aggressor endeavored from the very outset of the war to win air supremacy, to shatter the resistance of the Soviet troops, to capture important areas and prevent a strategic deployment. Military operations were initiated immediately and simultaneously on a front of more than 2,000 km long and 300-400 km in depth. With the going over to the offensive at the beginning of July by the Finnish troops in the north and the Romanian troops in the south, the front of armed combat reached 4,000 km.⁴

The Nazi Command in the course of the offensive widely employed pincer strikes in the aim of splitting our strategic front as well as for outflanking and enveloping the defending Soviet troop groupings for coming out in their rear and subsequently surrounding them (the Baltic, the western areas of the Ukraine and Belorussia). However, the Nazi command did not succeed in creating such a tight ring of encirclement which would prevent a significant portion of our troops from escaping.

The Soviet Armed Forces opposed the enemy with an active strategic defense which developed into the conducting of defensive operations by the first strategic echelon such as the Baltic, Belorussian and the Right Bank Ukraine (22 June-10 July 1941). The aim of this was to undermine the enemy's offensive capabilities and to grind down and bleed white its attack groupings. In conducting fierce defensive battles, the Soviet troops combined a stubborn defense of the occupied lines with retreat. With the impossibility or inadvisability of the further holding of the defended areas, the formations and operational field forces of the Soviet troops executed a maneuver to pull out from under the enemy attacks and to retreat to the next defensive lines in depth.

The numerous counterattacks and the army and front counterthrusts which involved, as a rule, mechanized formations were the highest manifestation of an active defense and an inseparable part of the defensive actions of the Soviet troops. For example, these were the counterthrusts by the troops of the Northwestern and Western Fronts from the regions of Kaunas and Grodno toward Suvalki, the counterthrusts of the Southwestern Front toward Lublin. Individual counter-attacks and counterthrusts by the Soviet troops developed into meeting battles and engagements. The largest of these was the tank meeting engagement on the Southwestern Front which developed from 23 through 29 June 1941 in the area of Radekhov, Brody and Rovno.

Even under the extremely bad situation which developed as a result of the treacherous invasion by the Nazi aggressors, the Soviet Army showed the falaciousness of the calculations of the Nazi leadership for a quick victory in the fight against the socialist state.

Regardless of the initial major successes of the Wehrmacht, even the initial period of the war showed that the military adventure of the Nazis was doomed to defeat. In the course of the border and subsequent defensive engagements, due to the tenacity and stubbornness of the Soviet troops, the planned dates and rates of advance of the Nazi Army were not met. The Nazi Command was forced to make adjustments in its operational-strategic plans.

Having encountered decisive resistance from the Soviet troops, the aggressor in the very first operations suffered major losses in personnel and combat equipment. By mid-July in the ground forces alone, the losses were around 100,000 men and around one-half of the tanks involved in the offensive. German aviation lost 1,284 aircraft.

The war decisively upset the plans of the leaders of Nazi Germany who were wagering on the instability of the multi-national Soviet state. Confronted by the terrible danger hanging over the nation, the peoples of the Soviet Union rallied even closer around the Communist Party and were motivated by a single ardent aspiration of conquering the enemy.

The Soviet military fought stubbornly and courageously against the superior enemy forces and they acted decisively, preferring death to the surrendering of the occupied positions to the enemy.

An objective assessment of the events which occurred indicates that the successes of the Nazi Army at the outset of the war were explained by those major temporary advantages which it possessed as a result of utilizing the military-economic resources of virtually all Western Europe and the extensive early preparation of aggression against the USSR.

An analysis of the period which preceded the Great Patriotic War indicates the increased importance of achieving surprise. In the aim of a surprise first strike, the Nazi leadership carried out a large range of measures involving virtually all the bodies of state and military administration, all means of mass information and the diplomatic corps. Here the main goal of the political actions was to conceal the very fact of the aggression being prepared and to prevent the nation which was to be attacked from promptly discovering the danger threatening it. The surprise and deception were aimed at concealing the very measures related to organizing the aggression, and in particular the strategic deployment of the armed forces, the axes of the main thrusts and the time of attack. The most limited number of persons was involved in working out the operational-strategic planning documents and measures were taken to mislead the enemy about the place, time and methods of action.

Among the measures to ensure surprise actions, a substantially increased role was given to misinformation which assumed unprecedented scope in the preparations for war against the USSR. Thus, in order to conceal the concentration and deployment of major troop groupings on the frontier with the Soviet Union,

in accord with the misinformation directive signed by Keitel on 15 February 1941, the Nazi Command sharply increased preparations for an invasion of England (Operation Sea Lion). The 16th, 9th and 6th Armies of Army Group A were involved in mounting this spurious operation.

Thus, the experience of the start of the Great Patriotic War clearly points to the necessity of maintaining high vigilance which should be shown on all levels and directed at unmasking and thwarting the progressive intrigues of imperialism and the prompt discovery of the military preparations of the probable enemies and their possible employment of new types of weapons and new methods of fighting.

Under present-day conditions, when the aggressive imperialist forces of the United States and their allies in military blocs have initiated broad-scale preparations for a new world war in the political, economic, ideological and military areas, and when they openly admit to the possibility and advisability of making a preventive strike, an imperative need arises for further increasing the vigilance of all the Soviet people and particularly their Armed Forces.

The initial period of the war convincingly affirmed the increased importance of the combat readiness of the Armed Forces to carry out the task of thwarting the aggressor's surprise attack. The actions to repel the treacherous attack by Nazi Germany showed that the real combat capabilities of the troops are determined not only by the quantity and quality of the personnel and weapons but also by the time which is needed to bring them into combat readiness. By the start of the war, the Soviet Army had significant might. If the troops of the border military districts had been brought ahead of time to full combat readiness, the armed struggle from the very outset could have assumed a more favorable nature for us and had a different outcome.

However, regardless of the fact that there were reliable data on the concentration of Nazi troops along the Soviet frontiers and that Germany was preparing to attack the USSR, the troops in the Western military district were not brought to a state of proper combat readiness.⁵ Due to the unfavorably developing situation, the Soviet Command was unable to carry out the measures of concentrating and deploying the troops and establishing the groupings envisaged by the cover plan for repelling the aggressor's strikes. A majority of the first echelon divisions of the cover armies by the start of the war was located in training camps which were 8-20 km away from the planned deployment lines. A comparatively small number of units and formations was positioned directly next to the frontier. In certain armies, the artillery and engineer units and the signals subunits were undergoing combat training in training centers away from their formations. The second echelons of the cover armies which consisted, as a rule, of mechanized corps, were located 50-100 km from the frontier while the second echelons and reserves of the districts were up to 400 km away from it.

Consequently, the lessons of the initial period of the last war require the constant maintaining of high readiness of the Armed Forces to repel a surprise attack by the aggressor. Here, under present-day conditions, the problem of parrying a surprise attack has assumed particular urgency. In the event of the initiating of a war by the imperialists, very little time will remain to organize retaliatory actions. This means that for repelling possible strikes by the

aggressor, the Armed Forces at any moment and in any situation should be ready to carry out the tasks confronting them.

The difficulties of conducting military operations were exacerbated by the fact that during the prewar years Soviet military theory had done little to work out the questions of preparing and conducting strategic defensive operations, of organizing and implementing the retreat of the armies and fronts and of conducting combat operations in an encirclement and escaping from it. The defensive was viewed as a temporary, enforced type of military actions which the Soviet Armed Forces could employ with a bad military-political situation and an unfavorable balance of forces in the course of an offensive. It was felt that defensive operations would be employed only on an operational-tactical scale.⁶

The Soviet Army had to master the art of conducting a strategic defense in the course of heavy defensive engagements which developed simultaneously along the enormous Soviet-German Front.

The questions of the mobilization deployment of the army and navy and the bringing of the border military districts to full combat readiness had not been completely worked out in prewar theory and codified in the documents determining the preparation of the Armed Forces for the war.⁷ There were also mistakes in determining the possible time of the attack by Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union and the related oversights in preparing to repel the first attacks by the aggressor.⁸

All of this had a negative influence on the deployment of the Soviet Armed Forces in repelling aggression and was one of the reasons for the unsuccessful outcome of the operations in the initial period of the war. The jump gained by the aggressor in deploying its assault groupings and the establishing of predominant superiority in forces on the selected axes with the excessive over-extension of the Soviet Army in depth made it possible for the Nazi Command to make a powerful initial strike, to seize the initiative and attack the troops in the border military districts piecemeal as these were moved up from the interior.⁹

In being guided by the experience of the last two world wars, it can be concluded that with an increase in the number and greater destructive might of the weapons, the length of the initial period of a war is shortened. At the same time, the use of qualitatively new weapons can create conditions for achieving in the initial period those results which to a significant degree will surpass the results in the initial period of the previous war. It must be expected that in a future war the first massed attacks which will be short in time will be capable to an enormous degree of predetermining the entire following course of the war and lead to such losses in the rear and troops which can put the people and the country in an exceptionally difficult position.¹⁰

With good reason, the Pentagon's strategic plans give main attention to making the first massed pre-emptive nuclear strike. The list of targets for this strike includes military potential installations, bodies of political, state and military leadership, major installations in the key sectors of industry, transport and communications as well as major administrative centers of the USSR. The results of the first strike, according to the calculations of the

American strategists, will make it possible to seize initiative in the war and achieve victory.¹¹

The experience of the first period of the war convincingly showed the increased role of troop maneuverability. Due to the fact that the Wehrmacht included a large number of tank and motorized formations, they had an advantage in mobility. Moreover, Nazi aviation, in maintaining air supremacy, made systematic attacks against our troops both on the battlefield and in the interior. All of this to a significant degree complicated the organization and implementation of the counterstrikes, the planned retreat to new defensive lines, their prompt occupying and engineer preparations.

As a consequence of the insufficient mobility, the armies being moved up from the interior in a majority of instances were late in reaching the destination and in preparing defensive zones. Thus, the moving up of the 20th, 21st and 22d Armies to the line of the Dnepr had not been completed by the beginning of July. Some 11 divisions were still on the way. The formations of the 19th and 16th Armies had not completed their concentration. By the moment the enemy reached the Dnepr, the defensive positions had not been built along this line. The hurriedly organized defense with a lack of the necessary resources, particularly anti-tank and air defense, were not sufficiently strong. The armies and fronts had to fight in broad zones and this forced virtually all the forces to be positioned in a single echelon. With such an operational configuration of the troops, the defenses did not have the necessary strength.

Due to the insufficient mobility of the formations, or the delayed decision to pull back the troops, the enemy succeeded in cutting their routes of escape and they were surrounded. In many instances this led to great losses and told severely on combat.

In the course of the operations in the initial period of the war, the strategic reserves played a particularly important role. These were employed primarily for stabilizing the enemy-disrupted strategic front in the main sectors of its advance. In order to create a strong and deeply echeloned defense to the north of the Polesye, Headquarters sent the basic portion of the reserves there. A group of armies from the reserve of the High Command (the 19th, 20th, 21st and 22d Armies) under the leadership of Mar SU S. M. Budennyy was deployed in the rear of the Western Front along the line of the upper reaches of the Western Dvina and Dnepr. The 16th Army which had been previously destined for the Southwestern Front was also sent to the area of Smolensk. In reinforcing the Western Sector, Headquarters on 28 June issued an additional instruction for deploying the 24th and 28th Reserve Armies in the rear of the army group.¹²

Regardless that all these troops were not completely supplied with weapons and combat equipment, they played an important role in repelling the strikes made by the Nazi Army, particularly on the Western Sector. The committing of major reserves made it possible to eliminate the wide breaches formed after the driving of the enemy into the defenses of the Soviet troops or as a result of the encirclement of their individual groupings.

The initial period of the war convincingly showed the importance of the closest cooperation among all the Armed Services and all-round support. Due to the fact

that aviation in the border militar districts on the first day of the war suffered great losses, air supremacy was captured by Nazi Aviation. Under the developing conditions, the combating of enemy aviation was carried out predominantly in the course of air battles. Attacks against enemy airfields due to the limited capabilities of bomber aviation were of an episodic nature and were carried out with relatively small forces. During the initial period of the war, the Soviet Air Forces also undertook raids against a number of defense industry installations deep in the enemy rear. From 23 June, the long-range bomber aviation and Naval Aviation made nighttime raids on the seaports and military plants of Konigsberg and Danzig, the oil refineries of Bucharest and Ploesti and military objectives in Helsinki, Turku and other cities. These operations were of important military-political significance. They unmasked Goebbels' fabrications that Soviet aviation had been completely destroyed during the first days of the war.

Due to the lack of frontal [tactical] bomber and ground attack aviation, from the very first days of the war the long-range bomber aviation was used to attack enemy tank and motorized columns. The battle formations of the Nazi troops, their reserves, command posts and communications centers also came under its action.

In supporting the Ground Forces, the Air Forces focused their main efforts on destroying enemy personnel and combat equipment. But because of the losses suffered it was not possible for the Air Forces to cover the Ground Forces from the air and effectively support combat operations.

A particular feature in the actions of the units and formations in the border air defense zones was that, in covering installations against air strikes, they at the same time were forced to fight the advancing enemy ground forces. Often this mission became the main one. The antiaircraft artillery was used to repel tank attacks while the antiaircraft machine gun units were used against enemy infantry. The aviation of the air defense zones in being under the air force commanders of the fronts in a majority of instances carried out missions of supporting the all-arms formations and field forces.

The nature of combat operations of the Soviet Navy in the initial period of the war was determined by the development of events on land. Its efforts were concentrated chiefly on holding the naval bases and major installations on the maritime sectors along with the ground forces, providing aid to the all-arms field forces in conducting the defensive operations as well as covering their maritime flanks from the sea. At the same time, with the start of the war, the fleet was confronted with the need to defend maritime shipments and attack the enemy coastal installations.

One of the difficult problems in the initial period of the war was the organizing of supply for the troops in the operational army. Due to the fact that the units of the troop and particularly the operational rear services were not fully up to strength and did not have the required amount of motor transport, the rear bodies were unable to successfully carry out their tasks. Logistical support for the fighting units and formations was carried out with significant interruptions. From the very first days of the war, the operational army was short of ammunition, fuel and other types of supplies although the dumps and depots in the border zone had sufficient supplies of all types of materiel.

The commenced war showed the imperative need to develop a partisan movement in the enemy rear. The Communist Party from the very first days of the war gave a purposeful and organized nature to the partisan movement. The Directive of the USSR SNK and the VKP(b) Central Committee of 29 June 1941 demanded: "In the enemy-occupied regions to set up partisan detachments and sabotage groups for combating the enemy army units, for initiating partisan warfare everywhere, for blowing up bridges, roads, for spoiling telephone and telegraph communications, setting dumps afire and so forth."¹³ By the end of 1941, more than 2,000 partisan detachments numbering over 90,000 men were operating on enemy-occupied territory.¹⁴

In terms of scale and military-political results, the struggle of all the people in the enemy rear assumed the importance of an important factor in defeating the Nazi invaders. This was also a powerful incentive example for the peoples in other countries which had fallen under the yoke of Naziism.

From the very first days of the war, the Soviet Command was confronted with a complex problem of organizing troop control under conditions where military operations were developing simultaneously along an enormous strategic front and covered a significant depth. With the start of the war the enemy aviation and covert agents put out of operation a large number of radios, centers and lines of state and troop communications. With the dynamic development of events and the rapidly changing situation, this impeded troop command. The command of the fronts and armies, not receiving regular and accurate data on the course of combat, the position and state of their troops and the nature of enemy operations, often was deprived of the opportunity to effectively influence changes in the situation and to inform the General Staff of this.

The situation to a definite degree was complicated by the fact that the bodies of operational-strategic leadership which had been established in peacetime did not fully correspond to the requirements of the commenced fluid war. Because of this, immediate measures had to be taken to establish the chief commands of the troops on the strategic sectors and to improve the central command and control apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Defense and to improve the methods of its work so as to ensure continuous control of military operations.

Thus, the experience of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War has not lost its importance at present. The value of it is that it again points to the need of constantly maintaining high vigilance against the intrigues of the aggressive imperialist circles, to strengthen the nation's defense might, to raise the combat readiness of the Armed Forces, to maintain them on a level of modern demands, to prepare carefully and in advance for repelling possible aggression and to always be on guard. This experience is constantly considered by our Leninist party. It does not overlook for an instant the questions of strengthening the defense might of the nation and its Armed Forces. The Soviet Army and Navy have everything needed to counter any military threat from imperialism.

FOOTNOTES

¹ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 4, 1975, p 44.

² "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 2, 1976, p 56.

³ V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 41, p 117.

⁴ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy..." Vol 4, p 43.

⁵ "Istoriya KPSS" [CPSU History], 6th Supplemented Edition, Moscow, Politizdat, 1982, p 450.

⁶ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy..." Vol 12, 1982, pp 280-281.

⁷ Ibid., p 280.

⁸ Ibid., Vol 4, p 58.

⁹ Ibid., Vol 12, p 280.

¹⁰ See: "XXII s"yezd KPSS. Stenograficheskiy otchet" [The 22d CPSU Congress. Verbatim Report], Moscow, Politizdat, 1962, p 112.

¹¹ "Otkuda iskhodit ugroza miru" [From Whence the Threat to Peace Derives], 2d Edition, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1982, p 65.

¹² "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy..." Vol 4, pp 44-45.

¹³ "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s"yezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK" [The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums], Moscow, Politizdat, Vol 6, 1971, p 19.

¹⁴ "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya," Vol 6, 1978, p 231.

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PREPARATIONS, CONDUCT OF OFFENSIVE IN FAR EAST TRACED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 84 (signed to press 24 Feb 84) pp 44-51

[Article adapted from the memoirs of Candidate of Military Sciences, Col Gen G. Vorontsov: "The 35th Army on the Hutou and Mishan Sectors"]

[Text] After the end of the war with Nazi Germany, I was serving in Austria in the position of the chief of the Operations Section of the Staff of the 4th Guards Army.

On the morning of 6 July I was summoned by the Chief of Staff, Gen K. N. Derevyanko.

"German Fedorovich [Vorontsov], get ready to leave for Moscow," he said. "An order has been received to send us to the General Staff. The commander as well as Gen M. P. Tsikalo are to report to Headquarters no later than 9 July."

Having noticed my amazement, he added:

"At 1500 hours the commander would like to see you and Tsikalo. He will provide more information on the purpose of the forthcoming trip."

At the designated hour I was in the office of Lt Gen N. D. Zakhvatayev. Here also was Lt Gen K. N. Derevyanko. Initially it was a question of improving the organization of combat and political training in the army's troops and a plan for the partial demobilization of the formation's personnel. Then the commander explained the purpose of our trip to Moscow: we were to receive an assignment to new positions and leave for the Far East. He set the take-off time for Moscow out of Vienna at 0600 hours on 9 July.

In Moscow, N. D. Zakhvatayev received an appointment as commander of the 35th Army, M. P. Tsikalo became the artillery commander while I was appointed the chief of the operations section and deputy chief of staff. The next morning we left for Voroshilov-Ussuriyskiy and on 12 July arrived at our destination. We made the first visit to the chief of staff of the First Far Eastern Front,¹ Lt Gen A. N. Krutikov. We were then introduced to the commander of the front, Mar SU K. A. Meretskov and the military council member Col Gen T. F. Shtykov. Kirill Afanas'yevich Meretskov provided a thorough description of the troops of the 35th Army and briefly sketched in the situation. I long remembered his

words on the fundamental reorganization of combat and political training for the army personnel. He reminded us that the Japanese ruling circles, having collaborated closely with the Nazi Reich in 1941-1944 had repeatedly and flagrantly violated the neutrality pact. In 1941-1943 alone, the Japanese troops had violated the USSR state frontier 779 times, they had invaded our territorial waters 206 times and fired on Soviet installations 72 times. In 1941-1944, the Japanese authorities had illegally apprehended 178 Soviet merchant vessels of which 3 had been sunk by submarines.² The Kwantung Army was preparing intensely to invade Soviet territory. Under these conditions, Kirill Afanas'yevich emphasized, the Soviet troop personnel in the Far East had been forced to work out in detail all types of defense as the basic method for conducting possible military operations against the Far Eastern aggressor. Everything, including the equipment of the theater of war, was subordinate to the defensive concept.

"And just since April," he said, "we have begun to fundamentally retrain the troops, build roads and airfields and prepare for decisive combat operations. For this reason, for the next 2 weeks you are to study the opposing enemy and the terrain, to calculate our capabilities and submit an overall concept and plan for the army's offensive operation."

Then he added:


"Now leave for the army and prepare it for offensive actions. Little time remains. You must work without regard to time."

Late in the evening of 12 July, we arrived at Lesozavodsk at the staff of the 35th Army. The commander had assigned 2 incomplete days for becoming acquainted with the leadership of the staff, the sections and administrations. The remaining time up to 9 August was full of intense work to prepare the first offensive operation in the history of the 35th Army. We would emphasize that we began all the measures, as they say, with some advantage. Prior to our arrival, the formation had already done a good deal in the area of preparing the personnel of the units and command bodies, for mastering the new combat equipment and generalizing data on the study of the opposing enemy. Extensive work to prepare the troops for the offensive had been done by the deputy army commander, Maj Gen I. N. Sobolev, by the military council members Maj Gens A. A. Romanenko and F. B. Chubunov, by the chief of the political section, Col A. M. Ignat'yev, by Col N. V. Krasnov who had been performing the duties of the chief of the operations section and others.

The formations and units of the 35th Army³ occupied a defensive zone around 220 km along the front, starting from the settlement of Guberovo as far as Lake Khanka, and around 200 km in depth up to the southwestern spurs of the Sikhote-Alin Range. We were separated from the opposing enemy by the Ussuri River and its tributary, the Sungach River (25-50 m wide and 3-6 m deep). On their opposite banks, the Japanese had built one of the strongest fortified areas in Manchuria, the Hutou. To the southwest was the Mishan fortified area. To the south and in front of these fortified areas was around 6,000 km² of forested-swampy plains with numerous islands overgrown with oak and maple forests.

Considering the difficult physicogeographic and climatic features as well as the enemy's defensive system, the 35th Army was given the immediate task of attacking with the main forces from the area to the southwest of Lesozavodsk to Mishan

in the flank and in the rear of the enemy Hutou fortified area and to capture them; subsequently to extend the offensive to Boli (see the diagram), in co-operation with the 1st Red Banner Army to destroy the opposing Japanese grouping and secure the right flank of the assault grouping of the First Far Eastern Front on the north.⁴



Axes of Advance by Troops of 35th Army (August 1945)

During 14-17 July, under the leadership of the army commander, a number of terrain reconnaissances were carried out. After them and talks with the leadership of the formations, Lt Gen N. D. Zakhvatayev on 18 July at an enlarged meeting of the military council and in the presence of the chiefs of the branches of troops and basic staff sections, clarified certain fundamental questions relating to the conduct of the coming combat operations and explained the plan. The main thrust was to be made on the left flank from the area of Pavlo-Fedorovka to Mishan, where the basic forces and facilities of the army were to be concentrated. The drive against Hutou was considered an auxiliary one. For conducting this, only one-third of the rifle, artillery and engineer units was assigned as well as two armored trains for covering the railroad and highway in the section Guberovo--Spassk-Dalniy. The area lying on the eastern banks of the Ussuri and Sungach Rivers between the settlement of Lazo and Lesozavodsk would be defended by subunits from the 8th Fortified Area.

The commander gave a simple but convincing explanation for such a plan. He said:

"We must initially cross inaccessible terrain and capture the weaker Mishan fortified area of the Japanese. This will then provide an opportunity to come

out in the rear of the Hutou fortified area and take it in a short period of time and with the least losses.

The plan for the operation was to be worked out over the next 5-6 days. Here it was essential to consider that the army troops under the conditions of the impassable terrain, in having a single-echelon operational configuration, were to advance in a zone of 215 km to a depth of 150-170 km. Here the distance between the groupings advancing on the main and auxiliary axes reached 200 km.

In preparing for the operation particular attention was given to the questions of the forthcoming crossing of the Ussuri and Sungach Rivers and to crossing the wooded, swampy terrain defended by the enemy. Large amounts of local improvised crossing devices and road building materials were prepared. Beams, ties, fascines, assault ladders, and gravel were brought in to the assigned points unbeknownst to the enemy and disassembled rafts of varying capacity were readied. More than one-half of the personnel of the divisions and brigades participated in carrying out these measures.

The planning of the operation and the preparation of the staging area were coming to an end. On 22 July the army staff was visited by the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Far East, Army Gen I. I. Maslennikov. N. D. Zakhvatayev invited me (at that time I was serving as the army chief of staff) to his dugout. Here I saw Ivan Ivanovich [Maslennikov] for the first time. In front of me stood a broad-shouldered thick-set man with a somewhat gloomy but cordial face. He immediately asked me:

"What is the army staff doing and what are the formation staffs doing? How are preparations of the troops for the forthcoming combat operations?"

"The personnel of the staffs is organizing troop command, providing aid to the commanders in preparing the jump-off position for the offensive and is supervising the moving up of the troops to the designated areas."

Having carefully listened to my briefing, I. I. Maslennikov requested a brief report of the plan for the forthcoming operation. Having set out the missions of the army, I drew attention to the particular feature of the operational configuration of the field force and to the composition of the commander's reserve. The 66th and 363d Rifle Divisions and the 125th Tank Brigade were to advance on the main sector and the 264th Rifle Division and the 109th Fortified Area on the auxiliary one. The 209th Tank Brigade and the 15th Separate Rifle Reserve Regiment had been assigned as the army commander's reserve. After brief reflection, Ivan Ivanovich, turning to N. D. Zakhvatayev, expressed doubt as to the effectiveness of using the tank brigades in the zone of advance of the army. For a more detailed discussion of this question, the commander of the army's armored and mechanized troops, Col Ya. P. Syun'kov was summoned to the dugout. He reported that the employment of tanks in the forthcoming operation required not only good tactical training from the tank troops but also technical preparation. Here the questions of the cooperation of the tank troops with the infantry and engineer subunits had to be worked out down to the last detail. Then I. I. Maslennikov voiced a number of requests on the employment of artillery. Gen N. D. Zakhvatayev reported that the army had artillery on mechanical traction along with horse-drawn artillery. Moreover, measures were being taken to reinforce the artillery subunits with rifle ones.

In replying to the questions of Gen I. I. Maslennikov on organizing troop command in the operation, I, in particular, reported where the command post was to be located and said that it would be moved on the boundary line of the 66th and 363d Rifle Divisions. A command-observation post (KNP) was being prepared on Mount Sokolinaya (2 km from the frontier) and here with the outset of combat there would be the army commander, the military council member, the chief of staff, the artillery commander and three or four staff officers. On the Hutou sector for troop control an auxiliary command post (VPU) was to be established for the army headed by the deputy commander, Maj Gen I. N. Sobolev, while a rear command post would be set up in Ussurka.

I. I. Maslennikov as a whole agreed with the plan for the operation and issued a number of instructions and recommendations, in particular, on the possible methods of combat. He paid particular attention to the need to achieve surprise for the offensive.

On 24 July, N. D. Zakhvatayev reported the plan of the operation to the front commander. It was approved. Late in the evening the army commander returned content to the army staff. Then the staff work went into full swing. Combat orders and instructions were issued to the divisions, brigades, fortified areas and to the individual units under the army. Questions of cooperation were resolved with the command and staffs of the 57th Border Detachment and the separate battalions of the armored trains. We began to work out in detail the plans for the combat, political and logistical support for the troops.

Particular attention was given to planning the combat employment of the artillery in the operation. Considering the particular features of enemy defenses, the tasks which the army was to carry out and its operational configuration, in addition to the regimental and three divisional artillery groups, two army ones were set up: one for supporting the actions of the main grouping and the second for destroying the Hutou fortified area. A particular feature in planning the employment of the artillery was that the artillery offensive was to start with a period of destroying firing structures.

In the course of preparing for the operation, the army staff gave great attention to organizing cooperation with aviation. Together with the chief of staff of the 9th Air Army of the First Far Eastern Front, Maj Gen Avn A. V. Stepanov, and the commander of its 33d Bomber Air Division, Col T. S. Korobeynikov, a planning table was worked out for cooperation. It designated the objects to be hit, it determined the detail of forces and the approximate time for summoning the aviation and indicated the executors.

The next, most interesting combat document was the plan table⁵ for the engineer support of the operation. This was worked out in detail by the staff of the army engineer troops under the leadership of its chief, Lt Col V. N. Odnopolenko. The problem was that for the army engineer troops, the laying of column tracks was the most important task along with supporting the crossing of the water obstacles. The questions of engineer support for the operation were also not overlooked by the front's staff. At the end of July, the army was visited by the front's chief of engineer troops, Col Gen Engr Troops A. F. Khrenov. Having studied the situation, he concluded that the engineer and combat engineer units could successfully carry out the given mission only with their

sufficient reinforcing with rifle troops. In this context, for laying column tracks in the zones of advance of the 66th and 363d Rifle Divisions, the following forces were employed: an army engineer battalion, three separate divisional and one brigade (the 125th Tank Brigade) combat engineer battalions, three rifle battalions and one motorized rifle battalion as well as a portion of the forces from the 11th Pontoon Bridge Brigade which had been attached to the army. In skipping ahead, I would like to emphasize that this made it possible to ensure the prompt construction of column tracks in the sector of the main thrust.

I would particularly like to mention the skillfully organized troop command. This was aided by a plan diagram for organizing communications during the operation which was worked out in detail by the signals section headed by Col V. K. Kurgayev. The plan envisaged interchangeability among all types of communications and their integrated employment. The personnel of the units and subunits from all the signals elements prepared actively for combat.

Effective planning for the operation ensured the proper work of the army staff and the formation staff in the course of combat. This was achieved by the prompt issuing to the troops of preliminary orders which were then confirmed by combat instructions (orders) with rigid control being instituted over their fulfillment. The command posts were brought as close as possible to the troops. Thus, a command post of a formation was positioned no more than 10 km behind the front line while the command posts of divisions were 3-5 km. The army KNP was located on cross-country motor vehicles. From this post the commander and chief of staff securely commanded the troops and maintained contact with the front's staff and the adjacent units. Aviation was called in from the KNP and its strikes were aimed against the enemy groupings and centers of resistance. In the course of the operation the army staff and political section systematically informed the inferior staffs of the successful and unsuccessful actions of the units and subunits. The liaison officers played a major role in increasing the effectiveness of the work done by the army staff. Majs V. K. Kozachenko and P. F. Sakhno, Capts A. A. Poltorak and I. P. Petrov carried out their difficult job indefatigably and effectively. Using various methods they secured data on the combat situation as it developed not only in the formations and units but also in the subunits and ensured the prompt passing of information from below upward and from above downward.

Before the start of combat the main task of party political work was to ensure the combat readiness of the troops and increase the combat skills of the personnel, to instill a high offensive verve in them, wholehearted dedication to the motherland and party as well as burning hate for the enemy.

On 8 August, the announcement of the Soviet government that effective 9 August the Soviet Union would consider itself in a state of war against Japan was read to the army personnel. In explaining the purpose of this statement, the commanders and political workers emphasized that the war against the Japanese aggressor would be a logical continuation of the Great Patriotic War and an inseparable part of the heroic struggle of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces against German Nazism and its closest ally, Japanese militarism. Meetings were conducted in the units and subunits while party and Komsomol meetings were held. The commanders and political workers explained the combat missions

and reminded the troops and officers of their military duty and of the difficulties of fighting under the conditions of the particular mountain taiga and swampy terrain.

At 0130 hours on 9 August, in the Mishan sector massed artillery fire was opened up against the enemy. Echoing it were loud rolls of thunder, lightning flashed and the rain came down in torrents. Accompanied by the roar of the guns and the raging elements, the Soviet military rushed the enemy. The Soviet border troops were the first to begin combat. Crossing on launches and boats, they wiped out the enemy border installations and dug in on the opposite banks of the Sungach and Ussuri Rivers. Simultaneously, men began crossing on improvised equipment from the reconnaissance companies of the 264th, 66th and 363d Rifle Divisions as well as separate reconnaissance groups from the 109th and 8th Fortified Areas. In the estimate of the army intelligence section, the scouts from the 118th Separate Reconnaissance Company of the 363d Rifle Division headed by Capt F. T. Cherednichek particularly distinguished themselves as did the 358th Separate Reconnaissance Company from the 264th Rifle Division under the command of Sr Lt V. A. Vekhov. They operated boldly and quickly in the enemy rear, securing valuable data on the number of the enemy and the nature of the defensive structures, providing this to the divisional staffs.

Behind the scouts the Sungach was crossed by the forward battalions from the rifle divisions including rifle companies reinforced by mortars, light guns and combat engineer subunits. As column tracks were laid, they were assigned to subunits of tanks, self-propelled artillery mounts [SAU] and regimental artillery. Fighting particularly successfully was the forward battalion from the 66th Rifle Division under the command of Maj N. P. Veger. In 24 hours it advanced 10-12 km and captured the strongpoints of Malyy Khunangan and Tachuo. It should be pointed out that on 10 August, on the basis of this battalion by an order of the army commander, a forward army detachment was organized and this was headed by the chief of staff of the field force's armored and mechanized troops, Lt Col P. A. Bykov, with a group of officers from the staff and political section. The detachment consisted of rifle and tank battalions, a company of submachine gunners (as tank-mounted troops), a separate self-propelled artillery battalion and a reconnaissance company. Its actions were bold and daring. In less than 24 hours, it fought its way more than 30 km and on 11 August had completely carried out its immediate task of cutting the rail and road lines in the Hulin--Mishan sector. Here more than 200 enemy soldiers and officers were destroyed and around 1,000 persons taken prisoner.⁶

Events developed differently on the army right flank. In the morning of 9 August, when the skies cleared of the clouds, a powerful 40-minute artillery and air softening up was carried out against objectives in Hutou with the armored train guns participating in this. At 1100 hours, a forward battalion from the 264th Rifle Division under the command of Capt G. A. Kuznetsov successfully crossed the Ussuri River to the south of Hutou and captured a bridgehead from which an advance was then initiated by subunits of the 1,060th (commander, Maj G. I. Rabakidze) and 1,056th (commander, Maj M. K. Strokov) rifle regiments from this division as well as subunits from the 109th Fortified Area.⁷

Due to the bold and decisive actions of the forward units, on 9 August the army troops on the very first day of the operation, having crossed difficult terrain,

had fought their way 8-15 km and reached the line of Youeya Station (to the southwest of Hutou), Wydaohe, Malyy Khunangan and Malyy Tayangan.

At 2200 hours on 9 August, in a telegram to N. D. Zakhvatayev, A. A. Romanenko and G. F. Vorontsov and signed by K. A. Meretskoy, T. F. Shtykov and A. N. Krutikov, commendation was expressed to the troops for the results achieved, the zeal and courage shown in crossing the Ussuri and Sungach Rivers and in crossing the difficult areas on their western banks.

Our adjacent units also had advanced successfully. On the right, to the northwest of Hutou, the V Separate Rifle Corps of the Second Far Eastern Front was fighting while to the left the forward units from the LIX Rifle Corps of the 1st Red Banner Army crossed the Mulinghe River. In cooperation with them, the troops of the army liberated Hutou and occupied a series of strongpoints in the Mishan Fortified Area. In the course of the battles, they destroyed around 600 enemy soldiers and officers and captured over 2,000, while seizing large-caliber guns as well as dumps with ammunition and supplies.⁸

In the evening of 11 August, at the command post in Tachuo, the army commander summed up the results of combat over the first 3 days. He pointed out that the commanders of the formations, units and subunits, regardless of the presence of impassable areas of terrain, widely maneuvered in the aim of outflanking and sealing off the enemy centers of resistance. Thus, by employing an envelopment from the flanks and the rear, Malyy Khunangan, Tayangan and Tachuo were captured and these represented heavily fortified strongpoints of the Mishan Fortified Area. This did not come easily. The soldiers and officers, in advancing over the wet swamps, carried their own mortars, light guns and ammunition for them. The commander drew attention of those present to the efficient use of the divisional artillery and assault aviation and to the able actions of the units of the 264th Rifle Division (commander, Maj Gen B. L. Vinogradov) and the subunits of the 109th Fortified Area. Then the missions for the troops were clarified for subsequent actions. The commander of the 264th Rifle Division was ordered to make one rifle regiment available to Gen I. N. Sobolev and with the main forces of the formation to continue the rapid advance on Hulin. For increasing the effectiveness of combat operations of the 363d Rifle Division it was decided to put the 125th Tank Brigade under it. In the aim of accelerating the pace of building the column tracks in the zone of advance of the 363d Rifle Division, the 155th Reserve Rifle Regiment was assigned to it.

In conclusion the army commander drew attention to the necessity for immediately resolving the question of increasing the rate of advance by improving supply and engineer support for the units and formations.

The main missions in the concluding stage of the operation were carried out by the tank-reinforced 363d Rifle Division (commander, Col S. D. Pechenenco) along with the 66th Rifle Division. In the 363d Rifle Division a strong forward detachment was organized consisting of a tank brigade (minus the 3d Battalion), the 404th Rifle Regiment, the 472d Mortar Regiment and the 1,636th Antitank Artillery Regiment. Command for the detachment was entrusted to the commander of the 125th Tank Brigade, Lt Col A. V. Kuz'min.

The army troops continued to develop the offensive deep into Manchuria. On 13 August, the 66th Rifle Division (commander, Col F. K. Nesterov) captured the major road junction, the town of Dunan, and continued to advance toward Boli. Here more than 2,000 soldiers and officers were captured from the 1st Infantry Division of Manchukuo headed by its commander Col Din-Lipo. The 363d Rifle Division on 17 August, having defeated the garrison in Tszisi, crossed the Mulinghe River and continued to advance toward Linkou. On 20 August, in this city it linked up with the units of the LIX Rifle Corps of the 1st Red Banner Army. It must be pointed out that the 3d Battalion of the 395th Rifle Regiment of the 363d Rifle Division were the first to cross the Mulinghe and break into Linkou. Later on the Komsomol organization from the battalion was given a certificate of commendation for successful combat by the Primorskiy Kray Komsomol Committee.

With the entry of the troops of the 35th Army into Boli and Linkou and the defeat of the enemy at the Hutou Fortified Area, the army's offensive operation was successfully concluded. In assessing the actions of the army's troops, Mar SU A. M. Vasilevskiy wrote: "The 35th Army on 16 August reached the Jiamusi--Tumin railroad in the area of Boli and thereby firmly secured the right flank of the front's main grouping, having cut off the Japanese 4th Separate Army which was retreating to the south ahead of the troops from the 2d Far Eastern Front from the Mudanjiang grouping."⁹

In conclusion, I feel it necessary to point out that the successful actions of the 35th Army were possible due to the prompt and thorough preparations of its troops for the offensive operation. Particular attention should be given to the choice of the axis of the main thrust and the forms of maneuvering the troops considering the nature of enemy defenses and the terrain conditions. Of important significance was the use of a favorable moment for commencing the offensive which ensured a surprise attack by the Soviet troops against the enemy. In the course of the battles, valuable experience was gained in organizing and conducting an offensive along isolated axes.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Prior to 5 August 1945, the First Far Eastern Front was called the Primorskiy Troop Group.

² KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 14 August 1975; "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945. Kratkaya istoriya" [The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-1945. A Concise History], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1970, p 535; "Final" [Finale], Moscow, Nauka, 1969, p 48.

³ The army included: the 66th, 264th and 363d Rifle Divisions, the 8th and 109th Fortified Areas, the 125th and 209th Tank Brigades, the 215th Cannon Brigade and 224th High Powered Howitzer Artillery Brigade, the 62d Antitank Brigade, the 54th Mortar Brigade, the 67th Guards Mortar [Rocket Launcher] Regiment, the 1,⁺7th Separate Anti-aircraft Artillery Regiment, the 43d, 110th and 355th Separate Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalions, the 280th Separate Engineer Battalion and the 155th Separate Rifle Reserve Regiment. In operational terms the 9th and 13th Separate Armored Train Battalions as well as the 57th Detachment of Border Troops were also under the 35th Army.

⁴ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [The History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voyenizdat, Vol 11, 1980, pp 202, 203.

⁵ In the work practices of the army staff, extensive use was made of tables which largely replaced the textual part of the plans.

⁶ TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 390, inv. 8785, file 46, sheet 106.

⁷ Ibid., sheet 107.

⁸ Ibid., sheets 106-110.

⁹ A. M. Vasilevskiy, "Delo vsey zhizni" [The Cause of One's Entire Life], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1973, p 521.

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ORGANIZATION OF FIELD TANK REPAIR CENTER DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 84 (signed to press 24 Feb 84) pp 51-57

[Military Memoirs of Engr Maj Gen (Ret) A. Tarasenko: "The Repair-Recovery Center"]

[Text] In the course of the Rzhev-Vyazma Operation, the troops of the Western and Kalinin Fronts in March 1943 liberated the territory of the so-called Rzhev-Sychevka Salient from the Nazi invaders. Fierce battles had been conducted here previously. In this wooded-swampy terrain, many hit, broken down and stuck tanks remained on the battlefield and on the territory previously occupied by the enemy. The command of the Western Front was confronted with the immediate task of their recovery and repair.

In the morning of 15 March 1943, I¹ was unexpectedly summoned to the member of the front's military council, Lt Gen Intend Serv I. S. Khokhlov.

"Do you know the places in the area of Sychevka well?" asked Gen Khokhlov in greeting me.

"I know well the area of the autumn-winter battles of the 20th and 31st Armies but as for the territory liberated by our troops from the Nazi invaders in March I have still not been there."

"Well enough, let us take a look at these places together. On the liberated territory, according to a report from the 20th Army, in the area of the Rzhev-Sychevka Salient many of our tanks are still there and these must be overhauled and quickly returned to combat."

We drove out in two vehicles. The route ran across Volokolamsk, Shakhovskaya, Pogoreloye Gorodishche and then to Sychevka. Ivan Sergeyevich [Khokhlov] the entire way kept asking me about the course of repair work in this area: what the tank losses had been, what and how many of the front repair-recovery facilities had remained in the given sector and what the 20th Army still possessed. In a word, he was interested in everything about our service and I endeavored to answer all the questions as fully as possible.

But then came the memorable sites of the battles. The forward edge of the enemy defenses had run along this line. There were wire obstacles, antitank trenches,

pillboxes and a dense network of minefields at times with signs of "caution, mines!"

The closer we came to the Vazuza River, the more enemy and Soviet combat vehicles we saw scattered on the field. Covered with rust and soot, they were a severe reminder of the previous fierce battles. At the crossing over the Gzhat River we halted and got out of the vehicles. In the river we could see the turrets of several submerged tanks.

Our route then took us toward the Vyazma-Krchet railroad. We had not gone far when behind us a loud explosion rang out and the second vehicle had hit an anti-tank mine. We turned back in silence. The mood from all that we had seen was distressed. Each of us was thinking our own thoughts.

In driving up to the front's staff, I. F. Khokhlov said:

"We must immediately organize the salvaging and rebuilding of the tanks which have been left on the battlefield. You must head and organize all this work."

"As you order," I replied.

"And you should feel that this is an order."

The order appointing me the chief of the repair-recovery center was soon signed by the chief of the front's armored directorate Lt Gen Tank Trps D. K. Mostovenko. By this same order Maj V. M. Babayev was appointed my deputy for political affairs.

For setting up the center, from the front's repair and recovery equipment we were assigned: the 26th Separate Repair-Recovery Battalion, the assembly-disassembly company for repairing T-34 tanks (from the 22d arvb [motor vehicle repair and recovery battalion]), an assembly-disassembly company for repairing T-60 and T-70 tanks (from the 132d orvb [weapons repair and recovery battalion]), a company for repairing the KV and T-34 tanks from the 82d Tank Repair Depot, a company for repairing T-34 tanks from the repair plant of the Armored and Mechanized Troops of the Red Army, the 68th and 69th Recovery Companies, the 55th Disabled Equipment Assembly Point (SPAM), and a road service with spare parts and units from the 105th Front Armored Supply Dump. From the front's engineer troops we were given a combat engineer company for clearing mines off the tanks and the approaches to them.

Thus, the repair-recovery center included around 850 men. This was a new direction in organizing tank repairs. Later in the reports from the commander of the front's armored and mechanized troops, our group began to be called a repair center.

For exercising direct supervision over the work of the repair center, Gen I. S. Khokhlov ordered the front's signals chief to establish telephone contact with us and I was ordered to report daily on the number of recovered and repaired tanks. Together with V. M. Babayev, we traveled to the area of the forthcoming work for determining the site for the repair center subunits. After careful reconnaissance, a decision was taken to locate it close to the Osuga railroad

station. The choice of this place was determined by a number of circumstances. In the first place, the rail line ran nearby and over it, after reconstruction, it would be possible to receive the required freight and food as well as send off the repaired tanks. Secondly, during their flight the Nazis had left an entire panel barracks where we intended to locate the center's headquarters and a portion of the personnel. Finally, and thirdly, the largest number of tanks to be repaired was in this area.

At the end of March 1943, the concentrating of the repair, recovery and other subunits in the area of Osuga Station had been completed. It was cold, uncomfortable and uninhabited. While the combat engineers were clearing the accesses to the tanks and the tanks themselves, the personnel of the repair and recovery facilities built dugouts and a bathhouse. The repairmen organized their routine thoroughly and permanently.

In parallel with the routine work, a careful survey was made of the location of the damaged tanks and the degree of their immobilization was determined as well as the amount of repairs. A special work group of salvage men, repairmen and combat engineers was organized for resolving these and other questions. The chief of the 55th SPAM, Maj Engr V. F. Tokarev, was put in charge.

By mid-April the entire area had been carefully investigated, the locations of the tanks had been clarified and the vehicles had been counted requiring salvaging, repair or scrapping. There were over 300 units. On the basis of the data obtained we drew up a work plan for the recovery and repair subunits.

A particularly major contribution to reconnoitering the equipment to be repaired was made by the personnel of the 55th SPAM. The Red Armymen N. Kirillov, V. Semechkin, I. Lebedev, K. Zaytsev, I. Sorokin and V. Yarunin under the leadership of MSgt V. Kotenko, in trudging with heavy boots through the mud of the soggy roads, hunted for the tanks night and day. They often had to clear the approaches to the tanks and the tanks themselves of mines.

The salvage workers carried out a difficult job. They quickly assembled the tanks at the SPAM and provided a work front for the repairmen. The personnel of the 69th Recovery Company, particularly the Tractor Operators 1st Class Pvts I. Bezzubko, I. Puzenko, V. Zelenskiy and others showed great resourcefulness and initiative in the process of recovering the deeply stuck tanks. Such specialists as the commander of the tractor platoon of the 68th Recovery Company, Lt S. M. Lukashev and the tractor driver from this platoon, Pvt A. Shestopalov, and others on individual days recovered 12 tanks back to the SPAM.

By 10 April all the repair facilities of the SPAM were already at work on the assembled equipment.

Spring at Osuga brought many problems and disappointments. The swollen ground impeded the salvage work. The repairmen had to work in mud and wet. The awakened rivers interrupted communications and food was running low. I informed the military council member I. S. Khokhlov of the developing situation. The news received was promising as we would be supplied by air until the railroad was rebuilt. And literally on the next day Y-2 aircraft delivering food began arriving one after another.

I tried to employ each free minute so as to become better acquainted with the personnel of the repair center.

I still knew the repairmen of the 26th orvb little. This was my first joint work with them. The battalion's commander Maj Engr A. M. Mal'tsev was a good organizer and indoctrinator of the personnel. He had an excellent knowledge of repairs and was able to organize cooperation in the work of the battalion's repair companies. Subsequently, relying on the battalion officers, A. M. Mal'tsev helped me greatly in directing all the work in mine clearing, recovery and repair on the tanks.

Somewhere in the woods, not far from the SPAM, the scouts discovered two KV tanks, five T-34 and three T-60. They had all sunk into the peat bog up to their turrets. An examination showed that all the vehicles had been cleverly mined. To the honor of our combat engineers, they figured out the enemy traps and the vehicles were cleared without injury. As for their salvaging, this took a lot of effort. Although the tanks did not have artillery and other damage, they had to be completely disassembled as all the tank units were full of swamp mud.

In the third week of April, Osuga Station was visited by the first receivers of the 145th Tank Brigade. Shining in the spring sun in their freshly painted armor, the tanks were a joy to behold for the crews. And when the tanks were tested out underway and their technical reliability was confirmed, the joy became universal.

"We are receiving from you, in essence, new tanks just like from the factory," said the tank troops.

These words were the highest award for us, the repairmen, and caused a new, even greater upswing among the personnel.

Several days later, at the end of April, we supplied still another, the 2d Guards Tank Brigade. This was tangible aid to the front. In rebuilding the tanks, the personnel of two repair companies had distinguished themselves, those of Capt Grigoriy Nikolayevich Plakatin and Mil Tech 1st Class Vladimir Petrovich Ivliyev.

The repairmen from these companies received tanks with severe damage to the hulls, sometimes requiring factory conditions for repair. However, they successfully carried out these repairs under field conditions, setting an example for others. This involved both the quantity and the quality of the overhauled tanks. For example, on one of the T-34 tanks, an artillery shell had caused significant damage to the final drive. In addition, as a result of hitting a mine, the alignment of the engine and the transmission had been lost. Because of the amount of work the vehicle was to be returned to the rear to the plant. Having carefully examined the damage to the tank, Sr Sgt K. A. Sbitnev consulted with the soldiers S. N. Kurkin, I. N. Gorokhov and the mechanic Sgt A. K. Lomov on the possibility of rebuilding the vehicle, and after long hesitation it was decided to rebuild the tank in the field. In this decision one could feel not only a technical risk but also a firm confidence in their own work hands and, most importantly, a desire to do what was seemingly impossible.

The work of our repair center became known at the Red Army Tank Repair Directorate and the People's Commissariat of the Tank Industry. We learned this later, when our repair center was visited by the People's Commissar of the Tank Industry V. A. Malyshev and a group of generals and officers.

...9 May 1943. Spring had fully arrived. The air was fragrant with the smells of the awakening forest and the sounds of singing birds. That morning a group of officers and I were engaged in preparing to turn over a new batch of repaired tanks destined for the 10th Guards Tank Brigade. According to the schedule the receivers were to arrive on 13 May. By their arrival we concentrated the repaired tanks usually on the edge of the forest not far from the SPAM. Here they were presented for delivery to the tank troops. The repairmen jokingly called this place the delivery shop.

And this was the case now. By 1100 hours, 28 T-34 and T-60 tanks had been assembled on the edge of the forest and we were inspecting them closely. During the inspection Babayev turned to me and said with surprise:

"Look, some of the leadership has arrived here!"

"What chiefs?" I asked Babayev.

"They are already near, do you see?"

In fact, several cars were rapidly approaching our position. The arrival of the People's Commissar of the Tank Industry Vysacheslav Aleksandrovich Malyshev who in February 1943 headed a commission to organize tank repairs under the GKO [State Defense Committee] (in truth, at that time we did not yet know about this appointment), the Deputy Chief of the Red Army Tank Repair Directorate Maj Gen Engr-Tank Serv A. V. Mel'nik and the Deputy Commander of the Armored and Mechanized Troops of the Western Front for Repairs and Supplies, Maj Gen Tank Trps I. Ye. Ivanin, as well as a group of officers was a total surprise for us.

I was trying to guess why such important chiefs had shown up. I was inclined most to think that it was a side visit. However, soon everything became clear.

"Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Malyshev and Andrey Vasil'yevich Mel'nik have come to learn about the work of our tank repair center," said Gen Ivanin turning to me.

"Tell us, Comrade Tarasenko, about your secrets," said the people's commissar immediately resorting to business.

"There are no secrets in our work, we merely repair the battle-damaged tanks, like many other repairmen. In truth, we have a rather unusual situation and are working deep in the troop rear where there are better conditions for repairing the vehicles with a large amount of work."

"We are interested in learning the details of the scope of this work."

"Have a look, Ivan Yemel'yanovich [Ivanin]," commented V. A. Malyshev, turning to Ivanin, "how the finished product has been lined up at the plant."

"You should have seen these tanks before repairs," said the commander of the repair-reconstruction battalion Maj Mal'tsev, entering the conversation, "it was awful to look at them."

"Yes, I can see that you have done the repairs well," continued the people's commissar, "however, let us look at the tanks and you describe how you rebuild them."

I described the difficult battles in the autumn and winter of 1942-1943 which our tank troops had conducted against the Nazi invaders on the much-devastated Smolensk land. I spoke about the unstinting work of the repairmen and recovery troops to return the tanks to battle, on their increased skill in work, how they carried out difficult repairs on tanks and tank units under field conditions and on interruptions in the supply of spare parts and units for the repair shops which created additional difficulties in work.

"Do you overhaul motors here?" asked V. A. Malyshev with interest.

"We do not overhaul tank engines. In truth, we sometimes change the gaskets of the heads or tighten the retaining studs. As for the other tank units, we either repair or change. We are forced to repair units because of the great interruptions in their centralized supply."

Then I answered a number of other questions.

"If one mentions specialists for repairing tank units, we have great experts. However, the lack of the necessary stand equipment and a number of special devices does not make it possible to test the units after their repair. We test the units only on the tanks. And this often leads to delays in finishing the repairs."

"At first," I continued, "we created repair stock for the tank units by removing them from totally unrepairable tanks. Then gradually we began to disassemble them in looking for the essential part. Sometimes we assembled one unit from two or three disassembled ones. Gradually there was a shortage of the most frequently used parts and these we began to obtain from the front armored dump and sometimes from the central dumps."

In conversing, the group was moving toward the repair area for the tanks and tank units. We walked under an awning made from canvas. Here were the work areas for repairing transmissions, the main and steering clutches, the final drives and other units. Mil Tech 1st Class Vasiliy Vasil'yevich Zyrin, the commander of the special works company, acquainted those present with the organizing of tank unit repairs.

Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich sometimes spoke directly to the repairmen to clarify certain technical questions. As a highly educated engineer, it was important for him to know everything: how they determined the complete engaging of the gears, how they established the radial and axial clearances in bearings and much else.

"And what about the quality of repairs?" V. A. Malyshev asked the company commander.

"In the 6 weeks of its work, the company has repaired 61 transmissions and only 4 had to be removed from the tanks for a repeat overhaul; as for the other units, there were no complaints.

"Well they are able hands!" summed up V. A. Malyshev, turning to the generals and officers. "As they say, they are working in the field but the quality of repairs is high. Here are our reserves! Our repair units must be equipped with proper equipment and the question of overhauling tank units on the battlefield and not only the units will be largely settled."

When the group approached the repair brigade of Sr Sgt K. A. Sbitnev, the tank being repaired by it was already on its tracks. The internal equipment was being installed. I briefly reported in what condition the recoverymen had delivered this tank and pointed out that the repairmen at their own insistence had gone to work on it. V. A. Malyshev looked at me and then at Sbitnev in amazement. Then he crawled into the tank.

"Initially, when we turned the hull over," explained Sbitnev, "we ourselves were at a loss, seeing the rusted out bottom. We wondered if we could do it. There was a certain hesitation. But now everything is finished! Soon the tank will be back in combat."

At the end of the inspection, V. A. Malyshev was surrounded by repairmen who had assembled to hear the advice of the people's commissar. In speaking with them, V. A. Malyshev particularly dwelt on the heroic work of the Soviet people in the rear where the weapons of victory were being forged.

"The number of T-34 tanks being produced by the Urals plants," he emphasized, "even in March 1942, surpassed the prewar level. Now their production has been organized at a number of other plants. In all the titanic work of the tank builders one can feel the great attention which is being paid by the Communist Party and the Soviet government to the questions of supplying the Red Army with weapons and combat equipment."

In continuing the discussion of the deeds of the tank repairmen, V. A. Malyshev with great warmth and praise responded to their unnoticed but extremely important deeds.

"Without fail, I must tell the workers at the plants about your work. I will describe with what affection and tenacity you are returning the tanks made by them to a new life."

The repairmen in turn asked the people's commissar to express their great gratitude to the workers for the enormous effort which they had made to the cause of victory, in equipping the tank troops with mighty combat equipment.

It was far after noon when, having completed the inspection of the work areas for repairing the tanks and tank units, everyone had returned to the position of the SPAM. Along the way there was a lively exchange of opinions on the work of

the repair center between V. A. Malyshev and Gens A. V. Mel'nik and I. Ye. Ivanin. Sometimes the people's commissar turned to me to clarify individual details.

"Yes, here is something for us to think about," commented V. A. Malyshev. "We must more boldly develop the field industry. This makes great sense not only in purely military terms but also economic and state ones. We have the personnel, Ivan Yemel'yanovich, excellent ones, and most importantly, there is their youth and total dedication to their difficult job. And turning neither to me nor to Ivanin, he asked:

"You have not forgotten to commend them with decorations?"

"The front's military council, Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich, has had high praise for the work of the tank repairmen and recovery workers. So they do not feel left out," replied Ivanin.

"The military council member, Gen I. S. Khokhlov, has issued instructions to submit commendation lists for all repairmen and recovery workers who particularly distinguished themselves," I confirmed, in turn.

"It is very good that the front's military council has regarded your work so highly. Without fail the repairmen must be awarded decorations for unstinting labor. They completely merit this. The same tank in an operation has often been returned several times to combat due to the heroic labor of the tank repairmen.

In the meanwhile, evening was approaching. Having said farewell warmly, we saw off our high guests to Moscow and, alone again, long recalled the words of V. A. Malyshev on the work of the personnel and on future plans, and thought them over.

The visit by the people's commissar of the tank industry to the repair center caused a great upswing in the personnel. All of us for a long time remembered his arrival and comradely, cordial conversations. In the repair units and sub-units and in the entire large collective working at Osuga Station, there was an elevated mood and everyone accepted the high praise for their labor with pride.

After turning over and dispatching the overhauled tanks to the 10th Guards Tank Brigade, I left for the front's staff with the commendation materials about the repairmen, recovery workers, mine specialists and others who worked at the repair center. Here I was warmly received by Gen I. S. Khokhlov.

At that time, I had prepared a thorough report, illustrating it with figures and diagrams and this was particularly to the liking of the military council member. After the report I told I. S. Khokhlov in detail about the visit to the repair center by the People's Commissar of the Tank Industry, V. A. Malyshev. Ivan Sergeyevich immediately congratulated me warmly on receiving the Order of the Patriotic War 1st Degree and immediately presented it to me.

For awarding the orders and medals to the repairmen, Gen I. Ye. Ivanin came at the end of June. This was the most solemn moment in the life of our field

repair center. Changed into clean uniforms, all the men to receive decorations were formed up on the edge of the forest. It was a warm day without a single cloud in the blue sky. The men were transformed. Unconcealed happiness and excitement shown on their faces.

Governmental decorations were presented to Officers V. M. Babayev, F. V. Tokarev, A. M. Mal'tsev, N. I. Kuznetsov, V. P. Ivliyev, G. N. Plakatin and V. V. Zyrin, to all the brigade leaders of the repair brigades, to many repairmen and recovery workers as well as to the mine specialists A. I. Glebov, V. A. Kravchenko, V. G. Goloshchapov, a total of 126 men.

With each passing day the amount of work at Osuga declined. In the repair companies of Sr Tech Lt N. I. Kuznetsov and Sr Tech Lt V. P. Ivliyev (the 26th arvb) only nine T-34 tanks remained to be repaired, and in the company of Capt G. N. Plakatin (the 22d arvb) just five T-34 tanks. Soon thereafter all the work had been completed and we bid farewell to Osuga. The repair and overhaul subunits returned to their units.

The experience of establishing and operating a repair center was widely employed in the subsequent operations of the Western (Third Belorussian) Front. Thus, in the Belorussian Operation, the commander of the Armored and Mechanized Troops of the Third Belorussian Front organized two repair centers. One was on the Orsha Sector and the other on the Bogushev. The leaders of the work at these centers were the senior officers from the tank repair section of the front, Engr-Lt Col V. Bessonov and Engr-Maj S. Shanin.

FOOTNOTE

¹ During the described period, the senior officer of the Repair Section from the Armored Directorate of the Western Front, Mil Engr 2d Class Aleksandr Ul'yanovich Tarasenko, upon the order of the commander of the Armored and Mechanized Troops of the Western Front organized the operation of a non-T/O repair and recovery center in the Rzhev sector.

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AWARDS PRESENTED TO CIVIL WAR HEROES REVIEWED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 84 (signed to press 24 Feb 84) pp 58-63

[Archival materials prepared by Candidate of Historical Sciences O. Poletayev:
"Heroes of the Civil War"]

[Text] BUAROV, Ippolit Gerasimovich (1894-1951). He was born in Blagoveshchensk in Amur Oblast in a peasant family. He was a participant in World War I as a senior junior officer. He joined the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] in December 1918 as a Red Armyman, platoon commander, sergeant major of a team of mounted scouts, the commander of a company and battalion of the 150th Rifle Regiment of the 17th Rifle Division. After the war, he was a commander of the 153d Rifle Regiment, the Training Rifle Regiment and the 150th Rifle Regiment of the same division. In 1923-1924, he was the chief of the Unified Command School of the Bukhara Red Army, the deputy chief of police of the Bukhara NSR [People's Soviet Republic] and the chief of criminal investigation in this republic. From August 1924, he was a student of the RKKA Military Academy and later the commander of the 4th Turkestan Rifle Regiment. In April 1927, he was discharged into the reserves. He worked in police bodies and held administrative-management positions. By July 1941, he was again in the ranks of the Soviet Army as the commander of the 545th Rifle Regiment of the 389th Rifle Division, the deputy chief of junior political instructor courses in the SAVO [Central Asian Military District], chief of the Vsevobuch [Universal Military Training] Section of the Fergana and Manangan Oblast Military Commissariats, senior inspector of the Vsevobuch Section of the Ukrainian Military Commissariat and chief of the military chair at the Namangan Teachers Institute. From July 1947 discharged into the reserves for reasons of health. A lieutenant colonel.

- 1) "Confirmation is given for awarding, on the basis of the orders of the RVSR [Republic Revolutionary-Military Council] of 1919, Nos 511 and 2322 by the RVS [Revolutionary-Military Council] of the 16th Army of the Order of the Red

* Continuation. See: VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, 1969, Nos 2, 5, 8; 1970, Nos 2, 7, 10; 1971, Nos 2, 5, 7, 9; 1972, Nos 2, 6, 8, 10; 1973, Nos 1, 3, 6, 10, 12; 1974, Nos 2, 5, 7; 1975, Nos 2, 9, 11; 1976, Nos 2, 8, 10, 12; 1977, Nos 2, 4, 6, 8; 1978, Nos 2, 5, 12; 1979, Nos 2, 5, 7; 1980, Nos 7, 11; 1981, Nos 2, 5, 8; 1982, Nos 2, 5, 8; 1983, Nos 2, 5, 8, 12.

Banner...to the commander of the 1st Battalion of the 150th Rifle Regiment, Comrade Ippolit Georgiyevich Buarov¹ for having, on 20 August 1920, when... units of other regiments were sent by an incorrect route to Belsk, he, being sent by the brigade commander to locate and return the lost units, brilliantly carried out the mission. Due to the lack of communications, having mistakenly reached the [village] of Bryansk, Comrade Buarov, knowing the general direction, did not go along with the other units to Grodno, he turned toward Volkovyssk and in the city linked up with the brigade" (Order of the RVSR No 594 of 18 December 1920).

2) The chief of the United Command School of the Bukhara Red Army and the deputy chief of police of the Bukhara NSR, I. G. Buarov, received the Order of the Red Star 2d Degree of the Bukhara NSR for courage and self-sacrifice shown in battles against the Basmach on the territory of the Bukhara NSR in 1923 in which he was wounded (diploma of the Presidium of the All-Bukhara TsIK [Central Executive Committee], No 386 of 15 November 1923²).

GERMONIUS, Vadim Eduardovich (1890-1937). He was born in Vyatka Province, in a military engineer family. He was a member of the Bolshevik Party from 1920 and a participant in World War I as a lieutenant. He joined the RKKA in 1918. During the years of the Civil War, he was a clerk at the RKKA Main Artillery Directorate, the commander of a battery for interior defense of Petrograd, the 2d and 1st Motorized Cannon Batteries, the commander and commissar of the 2d Motorized Antiaircraft Battalion. He was a participant in suppressing the Kronstadt Revolt. After the war, he was commander and commissar of the 3d Motorized Antiaircraft Battalion, a student in the RKKA Military Academy, the chief of staff of the 3d Turkestan Rifle Division, the chief of a section of the SAVO Staff and chief of staff of the VII Rifle Corps. From June 1937, discharged into the RKKA reserves. Divisional commander.

1) "Confirmation is given to the awarding by the former RVS of the 7th Army of the Order of the Red Banner for excellence shown in combat on 17-18 March 1921 at Kronstadt...to the commander of the 2d Battalion of the Petrograd Air Defense Artillery of the Southern Group Staff, Comrade Vadim Eduardovich Germonius who was under the command of Comrade Voroshilov" (Order of the RVSR No 65 of 10 March 1922).

Appointed at the beginning of March 1921 as the chief of all heavy artillery on the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland, V. E. Germonius during the period of preparing for the decisive assault on the Kronstadt Fortress provided correction and control over the artillery fire of the shore batteries and on 18 March participated in the street battles in Kronstadt, showing bravery and heroism in this, and was wounded.³

2) "A list is announced of the command and rank-and-file personnel from the units of the SAVO who have been awarded the Orders of the Red Banner for feats shown in eliminating the Basmach raid in the spring of 1929. The grounds for this are the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR TsIK of 12-17 July and 7 August 1929...the chief of staff of the 3d Turkestan Rifle Division, Vadim Eduardovich Germonius..." (Order of the USSR RVS No 949/287 of 26 November 1930).

As the chief of staff of the detachment of V. D. Tsvetayev operating in Southern Turkestan as a composite special-purpose cavalry detachment under the command of V. M. Primakov, V. E. Germonius showed courage and high valor, serving as an example to the Red Armymen of personal bravery in the battles against the Basmach. During the combat operation in April-May 1929, the detachment of V. M. Primakov defeated Basmach bands numbering several thousand men.⁴

GODUNOV, Koz'ma Andreyevich (1894-1957). He was born in the village of Pocheppnoye in Dmitriyevskiy District of Kursk Province in a peasant family. Member of the CPSU since 1918. He was a participant in World War I as a private. He joined the RKKA in March 1919 as a commissar for dispatching recruit companies from the Dmitriyevskiy Reserve Battalion, the chief of a gun, a howitzer artillery battery, the commissar of an artillery battalion and the armored trains Nos 89 and 20. After demobilization from the army in 1922, he held soviet and administrative-managerial jobs. Since 1954, the recipient of a special pension.

- 1) "Confirmation is given to the awarding on the basis of the Orders of the RVSR of 1919, Nos 511 and 2322 by the RVS of the Western Front of the Order of the Red Banner to the below-given persons for outstanding bravery and valor shown by them during the period of the former offensive battles for Warsaw and the subsequent rear guard battles, namely...to the military commissar of the armored train No 89, Comrade Kuz'ma Godunov⁵..." (Order of the RVSR No 353 of 31 December 1921).
- 2) "Confirmation is given for the awarding on the basis of the Orders of the RVSR of 1919, Nos 511 and 2322 of the Order of the Red Banner by the RVS of the 12th Army for outstanding service on the Polish Front on 25-30 April 1920 in the region of Korosten, Malin and Irsha...to the military commissar of the armored train, Kuz'ma Antonovich Godunov⁶..." (Order of the USSR RVS No 166 of 24 October 1923).

The armored train No 89 and units from the 7th Rifle Division at the end of April 1920 were surrounded and fighting continuously against superior enemy forces. In repelling fierce enemy attacks, the crew of the armored train by firing helped the men of the division to break out of the encirclement and link up with the Red Army units. All the divisional wagon trains were completely taken out with a large number of prisoners and eight guns being captured.⁷

GOL'TSEV, Nikolay Dmitriyevich (1897-1942). He was born in Moscow in a textile worker family. He was a member of the Bolshevik Party from 1919. He participated in World War I as a private. He joined the RKKA in March 1918 as an officer candidate at the First Moscow Military Instructor Courses, he was a platoon commander, a regimental commandant, a company commander, the chief of the administrative crew of the 208th Rifle Regiment from the 24th Simbirsk Iron Rifle Division, the head of reconnaissance, and a company and battalion commander in the 7th Turkestan Rifle Division. In 1924-1932, he was a battalion commander in the 24th and 109th Rifle Divisions, a student in the armored command courses in Leningrad, an assistant commander and then commander of the 2d and 5th Tank Regiments. From 1933, he was the chief of a sector of the directorate of motorized and armored troops in the UVA [?Urals Military District], a commander of the 14th Mechanized Regiment of the 14th Cavalry Division of the KVO [Kiev

Military District], the chief of the motorized and armored troops of the VIII Rifle Corps and the Zhitomir Army Troop Group, the chief of the motorized and armored troops of the Baltic Military District, a student at the KUVNAS [Courses for the Advanced Training of Higher Command Personnel] and chief of the section of armored troops of the 18th Army. Major general tank troops.

- 1) "Confirmation is given to awarding on the basis of the Order of the RVSR of 1919, No 511 by the RVS of the Turkestan Front of the Order of the Red Banner...to the commander of the 1st Company of the 208th Rifle Regiment, Comrade Nikolay Gol'tsev for having, in combat at the town of Verkhne-Uralsk on 23 July 1919, in taking an enemy fortified position--Mount Izvoz, by his personal example he led his company to a wire obstacle and, regardless of the fact that the right flank company had fallen behind, forced the enemy to retreat from Mount Izvoz, threatening to outflank its left flank" (Order of the RVSR No 68 of 13 February 1920).
- 2) The commander of the 1st Battalion of the 7th Turkestan Rifle Regiment, N. D. Gol'tsev, in 1923 was awarded the Order of the Red Star, 1st Degree, by the Bukhara NSR (TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], folio 37837, inv. 3, file 377, sheet 1281).

In December 1922-January 1923, N. D. Gol'tsev headed a small garrison in the Central Asian village of Kulyab (in the mountains of Tajikistan) which many times had been besieged by superior forces of the Selim Pasha Basmachi band. Under unbelievably difficult conditions and with an acute shortage of water and food, the garrison heroically defended itself for 23 days. N. D. Gol'tsev repeatedly led the Red Armymen into hand-to-hand counterattacks, causing the enemy great losses. Inspired by the inexhaustible energy and personal bravery of the commander, the men endured all the hardships of the siege and ultimately defended the village. The defense of Kulyab has gone down in the history of the troops of the Turkestan Front as an example of the unbending tenacity, valor and heroism of the Soviet troops.⁵

OTRESHKO, Ivan Ivanovich (1896-1942). He was born in Voronezh Province in a peasant family. He was a participant in World War I as a junior underofficer. He joined the RKKA in May 1918 as a platoon commander of the 1st Volunteer Soviet Regiment, a chief of a team of infantry scouts from the 109th Rifle Regiment, assistant commander and acting commander of the 142d Rifle Regiment of the 16th Rifle Division. After the war he was the deputy commander of the same regiment. In 1921, he was discharged into the reserves due to illness. From 1941, he was again in the ranks of the Soviet Army. He was a participant in the Great Patriotic War and the deputy commander of a company from the 1,320th Rifle Regiment of the 413th Rifle Division. Killed in combat on 27 March 1942. Junior lieutenant.

- 1) "Confirmation is given to the awarding on the basis of the Orders of the RVSR of 1919, Nos 511 and 2322 by the Western Front RVS of the Order of the Red Banner to the below-named persons for outstanding tenacity and valor shown by them during the period of the previous offensive battles for Warsaw and the subsequent rear guard battles, namely...for the former 15th Army...the acting commander of the 142d Regiment, Comrade Ivan Ivanovich Otreshko..." (Order of the RVSR, No 353 of 31 December 1921).

2) "Confirmation is given to the awarding on the basis of the Orders of the RVSR of 1919, No 511 and 2322 by the RVS of the former 16th Army of the Order of the Red Banner...to the acting commander of the regiment, Comrade Ivan Ivanovich Otreshko, for excellence shown in combat on 4 August 1920 at the town of Ostrow" (RVSR Order No 19 of 23 January 1922).

By his personal example of bravery, I. I. Otreshko led forward the Red Armymen in the regiment and cut off the route of the enemy retreating toward Ostrow, providing the possibility for the remaining regiments in the brigade to take the city virtually without losses. In the course of further combat, I. I. Otreshko at the head of one of his battalions for several hours withstood the pressure of significantly superior enemy forces and this made it possible for the brigade to recapture Ostrow which had been given up. In this combat, the regiment captured two good guns and other supplies.¹⁰

SINENKO, Sergey Pavlovich (1901). He was born in the village of Grabovshchina in Konstantinograd District of Poltava Province in a peasant family. In 1917-1918, he was a soldier in the mounted partisan detachment of the Red Guard. He joined the RKKA in April 1918 as a Red Armyman of the 1st Mounted Regiment of the Special Brigade of R. F. Sivers, the mounted detachment of F. K. Mironov, the Iron Cavalry Regiment, a squad commander from the 35th Cavalry Regiment of the 6th Cavalry Division of the Mounted Corps of S. M. Budennyy, a student at the 2d Moscow and Baku Cavalry Courses for Command Personnel, a platoon commander in the 106th Cavalry Regiment, a student in the 3d Samara Cavalry School, the assistant commander of a squadron in the 64th Cavalry Regiment of the 11th Cavalry Division, the 46th Cavalry Regiment of the 8th Cavalry Division, a platoon commander for mounted reconnaissance in the 101st Syzran Rifle Regiment and the 47th Cavalry Regiment, a squadron commander of the 43d Orenburg Cavalry Regiment, and the deputy chief of staff of the 81st Turkestan Cavalry Regiment. From March 1934, he was in the reserve of the RKKA. He held administrative and managerial posts. From July 1941 he was back in the Soviet Army. A participant in the Great Patriotic War on the Western and Bryansk Fronts, a squadron commander of the 36th Cavalry Regiment, the deputy commander of the 253d and 250th Cossack Regiments, a student at the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze, and chief of the Ukrainian Military Stud Farm imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov. In August 1945, he was demobilized. Held administrative and managerial positions. Retired on pension in 1960. Lieutenant colonel.

1) "Confirmation is given to the awarding on the basis of the RVSR Orders of 1919, Nos 511 and 2322 of the Order of the Red Banner by the RVS of the Turkestan Front...of the 64th Cavalry Regiment of the 11th Gomel Cavalry Division...to the platoon commander Sergey Pavlovich Sinenko for excellence on 11 August 1943 in combat at the Central Asian village of Ukrach" (USSR RVS Order No 96 of 15 April 1924).

In combat against the Yar Karayev Basmach band at the Central Asian village of Ukrach in Samakand District, the young Red commander S. P. Sinenko showed great courage and heroism. Regardless of the heavy enemy fire, he led the Red Armymen into the attack, setting an example of bravery and self-sacrifice and thereby significantly contributing to the complete defeat of the band and the death of its leader.¹¹

2) The platoon commander of the 46th Cavalry Regiment, S. P. Sinenko, in 1924 was awarded the Order of the Red Star 3d Degree of the Bukhara NSR for excellence in combat against the Basmack of Eastern Bukhara in 1923-1924 (USSR RVS Order No 318 of 13 May 1925).¹²

TRUTNEV, Ivan Aleksandrovich (1878-1943). He was born in Krasnoyarsk in a worker family. He was a member of the Bolshevik Party from 1917. He participated in the Russo-Japanese War as a reserve private. From the end of 1917, he was the commander of the Red Guard Partisan Detachment at the Samara Pipe Plant and he fought against Dutov at Orenburg. He joined the RKKA in May 1918 holding the positions of a political commissar of the worker regiment, the 1st Don-Kuban and 1st International Cavalry Regiments, the 116th Cavalry Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, the commissar and then commander and commissar of the 1st Cavalry Regiment of the 2d Gorki Cavalry Brigade of the II Mounted Corps, the commissar of a cavalry regiment in the 9th Cavalry Division, and a student at the Higher Repeat Courses for the Senior RKKA Command Personnel in Kharkov. From 1925, he was in administrative positions. From 1937, he was retired on a special pension. From July 1941, he volunteered for the ranks of the Soviet Army, he participated in the Great Patriotic War and was a divisional military commissar. Colonel.

1) "Confirmation is given to the awarding on the basis of the RVSR Orders of 1919 Nos 511 and 2322 by the RVS of the former 4th Army of the Order of the Red Banner to the below-named comrades for excellence...in combat against the Vrangel counterrevolutionary troops in 1920 and 1921...to the military commissar of the 54th Guards Regiment, Comrade Ivan Aleksandrovich Grudnev¹³..." (RVSR Order No 166 of 7 May 1922).

In combat on 16 March 1921, against the Makhno bands, I. A. Trutnev by the personal example of his bravery and courage led the entire regiment into the attack thereby causing great losses to the enemy and the capturing of two machine guns from the Yegen'yevki column.¹⁴

2) "Confirmation is given to the awarding on the basis of the RVSR Orders Nos 511 and 2322 by the RVS of the former Kiev Military District of the Order of the Red Banner...to the military commissar of the 51st Cavalry Regiment, Comrade Ivan Aleksandrovich Trutnev...for excellence in combat against the bands on 12 November 1921 at the village of Gorodok¹⁵" (RVSR Order No 156 of 14 July 1922).

In combat against the Tyutyunik bands near the village of Gorotsk, I. A. Trutnev, having taken over for the commander who could not carry out his duties, assumed command of the regiment and personally led the men into attack, setting an example of bravery for them and thereby contributing to the success of the combat.¹⁶

CHUGUNOV, Petr Petrovich (1881-1922). He was born in Kazan in a worker family. He joined the Bolshevik Party in 1905. He was a participant in World War I as a cavalry sergeant major. He was an active participant in the establishing of Soviet power in Astrakhan. He joined the RKKA in June 1918, holding the positions of rayon military commissar, military commissar of Astrakhan District and later Astrakhan Province, a member of the defense soviet of the Astrakhan

Fortified Area, the Caspian-Caucasian Kray Military Committee and the chief of the garrison of Astrakhan and its surroundings, the military commissar of Astrakhan Province and chief of police of the city of Astrakhan, a member of the Astrakhan Military-Fortress Council, the military commandant and member of the military council of the Astrakhan Fortified Area, the commander of the 1st Brigade and the 5th Cavalry Division of the Turkestan Front, the chief of the same division, the assistant commander of the III Mounted Corps of G. D. Gay, the chief of the 15th, 9th and 5th Cavalry Divisions. From January 1921, he was the commander of the 78th Brigade of the VNUS [Internal Service Troops] of the Transvolga Military District and the commander of Astrakhan Kray, the military commissar of Astrakhan Province and the chief of the garrison of the city of Astrakhan.

1) "The Order of the Red Banner is awarded to the chief of the 15th Cavalry Division, Chugunov. In combat on 17 August 1920, at the town of Wroclaw, he was given the mission of capturing a bridgehead, seizing a crossing over the Vistula and cutting the rail link on the Warsaw--Torun line and for this the 15th Cavalry Division was given the 157th Brigade of the 53d Rifle Division. The enemy with a total strength of up to 3,000 bayonettes with the support of numerous artillery on the left bank of the Vistula defended the bridgehead strongly.... Our small units after 8 hours of combat had thrown back the enemy, captured the bridge, cut the wire to the charges placed to blow up the bridge and, having brought up the artillery to the river, deprived the enemy of the opportunity of using the Warsaw--Torun railroad. Here the enemy lost up to 500 men slaughtered, around 1,000 men captured and 20 machine guns at the site of battle. The retreat of the enemy beyond the Vistula provided an opportunity in subsequent operations not to fear this sector and this ensured the freedom of maneuvering for the army. Such important results were achieved solely due to correct leadership over combat by Comrade Chugunov who...during combat was in the most dangerous places and, sparing neither his life nor strength, set an example of outstanding bravery and courage" (RVSR Order No 577 of 4 December 1920).

2) "Hereby I announce the list of command personnel and military commissars from the corps assigned to me and awarded personally by the commander of the Southern Front, Comrade Frunze, on this 6th of November, the Orders of the Red Banner for excellence shown by them in battles against the Vrangel troops during the period of fighting from 15 October through 3 November 1920: 1. To the chief of the 9th Cavalry Division, Petr Petrovich Chugunov..." (Order to the troops of the Horse Corps of the 4th Army No 6 of 8 November 1920).¹⁷

"The chief of the 9th Cavalry Division, Comrade Petr Petrovich Chugunov, during the period of combat from 27 October through 3 November 1920 inclusively, in setting for the command personnel and Red Armmen a personal example of courage and bravery...inspiring them to feats, by skillful and able command of the units of the 9th Cavalry Division achieved a rapid and decisive victory over the enemy ...and occupied a whole series of population points and fortifications, having routed and destroyed by three-fourths and taken prisoner units of the 7th, 8th and 10th Don and Gundorov Enemy Rifle Regiments. This completely ensured the operations of the adjacent units (the 5th Cavalry and 9th Rifle Divisions) and contributed to the general defeat of the Vrangel troops operating in Yekaterinoslav and partially Tavrid Provinces. The 9th Cavalry Division under the command of

Comrade Chugunov over the above-indicated period fought and captured the columns of Waldheim, Gnadenfeld, Paulsheim, Rikenau, Tigerweide and Rykovo Station and...captured up to 4,000 prisoners in combat, including up to 20 officers, around 50 guns, over 100 machine guns, 6 airplanes, 5 armored trains, 5 motor vehicles, many shells, cartridges and grain, up to 20 steam locomotives with a large amount of rail cars..." (award certificate with a description of the feat of P. P. Chugunov of 6 November 1920).¹⁸

FOOTNOTES

¹ Given thus in the order.

² TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], folio 37837, inv. 3, file 375, sheet 192; GUK MO SSSR [Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense], record of service card of I. G. Buarov.

³ TsGASA, folio 1223, inv. 2, file 609, sheets 95-96; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 10 June 1925, p 4.

⁴ TsGASA, folio 37837, inv. 1, file 1307, sheets 12, 84, 85.

⁵ Given thus in the order. No more detailed description of the feat found in the archives.

⁶ In the order the name and patronymic of K. A. Godunov are given incorrectly. Koz'ma Andreyevich is correct.

⁷ TsGASA, folio 197, inv. 3, file 561, sheets 439 verso, 440.

⁸ "Boyevoy put' voysk Turkestanskogo voyennogo okruga" [The Campaign Record of the Troops of the Turkestan Military District], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1959, p 162; V. Leskin, "Boyevyye podvigi 7-go Turkestanskogo Krasnoznamennogo strelkovogo polka (1918-1928)" [Combat Feats of the 7th Turkestan Red Banner Rifle Regiment (1918-1928)], Chardzhuy, 1928, p 7.

⁹ Given thus in the order. The archives did not contain a more detailed description of the feat.

¹⁰ TsGASA, folio 104, inv. 5, file 544, sheet 519 verso.

¹¹ Ibid., folio 895, inv. 1, file 367, sheet 49; folio 110, inv. 4, file 253, sheet 21 and verso.

¹² The archives did not contain a more detailed description of the feats.

¹³ The order misspells the last name of I. A. Trutnev. At the beginning of the 1930's, he was issued an order booklet for two Orders of the Red Banner with reference to this and the following orders.

¹⁴ TsGASA, folio 25899, inv. 3, file 757, sheet 109 verso.

¹⁵ The order misspells the name of the village. The correct is Gorotsk.

¹⁶ TsGASA, folio 25880, inv. 2, file 994, sheet 550 verso.

¹⁷ Ibid., folio 7941, inv. 1, file 256, sheet 1.

¹⁸ Ibid., folio 7677, inv. 1, file 562, sheet 52. For the designated feat M. V. Frunze presented P. T. Chugunov with the badge of the Order of the Red Banner for No 2567. The order of the RVSR (USSR) on confirming the award to P. P. Chugunov was not found in the TsGASA.

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INTERWAR MOBILIZATION PREPARATIONS IN UKRAINE TRACED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 84 (signed to press 24 Feb 84) pp 64-68

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, Col (Res) D. Pikha: "On the Activities of the Party, Soviet and Local Military Administrative Bodies of the Ukraine to Prepare for Mobilization in the Event of War (1929-1941)"]

[Text] In the 1930's, considering the growing military danger, the Communist Party and the Soviet government showed constant concern for strengthening the economic and military might of the USSR. Great attention was also given to the question of preparedness to mobilize in the event of war.

In accord with the prewar views, it was felt that under the conditions of the massed employment of highly mobile troops and aviation by the enemy, combat could immediately encompass a large area both in length and depth. This required careful preparations for mobilization and deploying a mass army in a short period of time. Exceptionally high readiness to carry out such a mission was essential in the border areas, where during the first days of the war it would be necessary to supply the troops engaged in combat against the enemy with human and material resources.

In ensuring high readiness for mobilization, the military commissariats were assigned an important role. Their most important function was the accounting and mobilizing with the outbreak of war of the human and material resources assigned to resupply the Armed Forces. The forms and methods of induction registration work were constantly altered and improved.

In January 1929, in the Ukraine, as throughout the nation, the following system of registering human resources was instituted. The registration of the rank-and-file and junior command personnel in the reserves was entrusted to special bureaus located at enterprises, institutions and rural soviets. The military commissariats merely kept a total (quantitative) register of this category of persons liable for military service and a registry of reserve command personnel.¹

In the spring of 1929, a uniform military service card was introduced for all persons liable for military service in the nation. This made it possible in all regions, including in the Ukraine, not only to ascertain the entire draft contingent but also to allocate it more precisely according to military registration specialties and thereby improve the mobilization plans. At the same time, rules were established for registering and deregistering.²

In December 1929, in accord with the instructions of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] Main Directorate, the republic military commissariats reregistered all rank-and-file and junior command reservists born between 1893-1906 and who previously had worked in rail transport (at least 6 months) but were registered for other military specialties. At the same time a recount was also made for engineers, technicians, equipment operators, stokers, mechanics, boiler workers, steam locomotive repairmen, dispatchers and representatives of other specialties and vocations who had been employed in this economic sector. This measure made it possible to provide a more effective allocation of railroad specialists in wartime.

In 1931, the republic military commissariats made a recount and in the following year of 1932, in accord with the Decree of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee, a recertification of the middle-level and higher reserve command personnel. The latter measure was carried out with the active involvement of the Ukrainian Party Committees. For example, the Odessa party gorkom obliged all the party organization secretaries at enterprises and institutions to provide the military commissariats with the greatest possible help in conducting the recertification.⁴ As a result, the number of reserve command personnel was ascertained, they were assigned to branches of troops thereby making it possible to more effectively utilize the reserve command personnel in the event of war and in addition persons unfit for military service were discovered.

The republic provided training for the workers who were assigned to organize the mobilization. The basic forms of exercises were lectures, seminars and practical work. The mobilization workers from the military commissariat and city Soviet were the instructors at the courses.⁵

Mobilization games were widely practiced and in the course of these the leading cadres were given a broad opportunity to check the knowledge of their duties upon the announcing of a mobilization, the realisticness of the warning plans and the prompt reporting of the inductees and transport to the assembly points. After thorough analysis the results of the game made it possible to draw important conclusions for subsequent practical work.

The increased mobilizational readiness was also aided by inspection trips of workers from the oblast mobilization bodies to the various areas. For example, such a trip was made in July 1934 through the rayons of Chernigov Oblast. As a result it was established that the mobilization plans in Bakhmachnskiy, Repkinskiy, Nosovskiy, Dobryanskiy and other rayons had not been adjusted for a long period of time, the warning system had not been worked out as it should and the chiefs of the special bureaus of the designated rayispolkoms did not show proper responsibility toward their duties. In line with this, the Chernigov obispolkom obliged the rayispolkoms to eliminate the designated shortcomings within a 3-week period.⁷

The month-long contests for establishing the exemplary special bureau of an enterprise or institution and exemplary rural soviets and MTS [machine-tractor station] for mobilization work also helped to improve the quality of mobilization work. For example, such a month was held in December 1934 in the city of Kherson and in the villages of Kherson Rayon. It encompassed all enterprises, institutions, rural soviets and MTS.

The defense commissions under the oblispolkoms and party obkoms watched over the state of mobilization preparation constantly.

In 1937, a new registering and recertifying of reserve command personnel were carried out. The Ukrainian party committees assigned representatives of the party gorkoms and raykoms as well as the city and rayon executive committees of the soviets for participating in the work of the certification commissions under the military commissariats. They obliged the primary party organizations to submit recommendations which thoroughly described the person being certified, including his attitude toward service duties and social work.⁹ The course of recertification was discussed by the party obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms at sessions of the bureau. The reregistering and recertification, in the view of the Kiev KP(b)U [Ukrainian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] obkom, made it possible to purge the reserve command personnel of persons who in their moral qualities and military skills did not meet the demands made upon reserve command personnel.

Demands were also increased on the communists to observe the military registration rules. For example, the Volyn District Party Committee in 1938 issued instructions to the secretaries of the party gorkoms and raykoms that the party members should not be taken off the membership of the party organization until he had been removed from the registration at the military commissariat and not registered with the party organization until he was registered at the military commissariat.¹⁰ This made it possible for the latter to keep accurate records of the available party forces and provide for their allocation in the mobilization plans.

In line with the conversion at the end of the 1930's to a cadre system for the organizational development of the Red Army, instead of the former corps, divisional and brigade territorial districts, military commissariats were established in the cities, rayons, oblasts, krays and autonomous republics.

A new procedure for registering persons liable for military service was instituted by the Law "Governing Universal Military Service" of 1 September 1939. Its essence consisted in a changeover to registration at the place of residence. Registration of the reserve rank-and-file and junior command personnel began to be carried out by the military registration desks under the municipal police departments and rural soviets, while the rayon and city military commissariats kept the numerical registration for the branches of troops and military specialties. Registration of the reserve command personnel was also kept by the rayon and city military commissariats. Registration and deregistration were carried out simultaneously by registration and a copy in the house book.¹¹

The new Law "Governing Universal Military Service" extended service in the reserves from the age of 40 to the age of 50. For this reason, in July-November 1940, a new recount was made for reserve rank-and-file and junior command personnel. In line with it, the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army obliged the local military command bodies to develop extensive work in the masses to explain the goals and tasks of the military recount and the duties of persons in the reserves.¹² The Ukrainian party committees showed great responsibility for this matter. Thus, the question of the recount was discussed at sessions of the party obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms. Upon their initiative,

with the workers of the military commissariats and the recount points, special seminars were conducted aimed at providing practical skills for the recount. The Odessa KP(b)U obkom, for example, organized such a seminar at one of the best recount points at the Ilichevsk military commissariat. The Ternopol party obkom entrusted supervision over the preparation and course of the recount to the first secretaries of the KP(b)U gorkoms and raykoms.¹³

The republic party organizations everywhere took part in setting up the recount points, they assigned the best propagandist forces for conducting mass political work, they made up visual agitation and organized efficient handling of the reservists arriving for the recount. In Zaporozhye Oblast alone, the agitation and propaganda measures encompassed over 143,000 persons.¹⁴

The preparation of transport for the Red Army was a component part of the work to ensure mobilizational readiness. This task was entrusted to the leadership of the kolkhozes, sovkhozes, MTS, institutions and enterprises. In 1931, the republic Komsomol assumed the obligation of organizing the caring for horses assigned to the RKKA. In 1934, 55,000 young enthusiasts were involved in this work.¹⁵ The Ukrainian kolkhoz peasantry carried out difficult work in raising tens of thousands of riding and artillery-wagon horses. In 1940, the kolkhozes of Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, for example, were ready to deliver to the Red Army some 12,398 horses in accord with the mobilization plan; in Odessa Oblast the figure was 12,294 horses, in Zaporozhye Oblast 8,848, in Kirovograd Oblast 3,467 and in the Moldavian ASSR 13,368.¹⁶ This comprised approximately one-half of all the horses in the designated oblasts. Proper attention was also given to preparing wagons with harnesses for the Red Army.

Particular concern was shown for the readiness to supply the Red Army with tractors and motor vehicles. The defense commissions under the obispolkoms and the party obkoms saw to it that these were maintained in a good technical state and were supplied with spare parts and fuel. In 1940, just the enterprises, institutions, kolkhozes, sovkhozes and MTS on the territory of the Odessa Military District (not including Zaporozhye oblast) were maintaining 4,768 wheeled tractors and 2,049 caterpillar ones, 24,910 trucks, 3,642 passenger cars and 1,528 special motor vehicles ready to be turned over to the Red Army.¹⁷

In ensuring high mobilizational readiness, an important role was assigned to the means of communications. Communications equipment was essential first of all in the border areas. At the same time, their condition in the Ukraine at the beginning of the 1930's was far from meeting the requirements of a military situation. Telephone and radio communications, in essence, had just begun to develop. For example, in Kiev Oblast in 1932, of the 2,597 rural soviets, only 688 had telephone contact with the rayons and this was less than 2^c percent of the total number.¹⁸ The situation was even poorer with the installation of radios. In truth, by the end of 1933, virtually all rayon centers had radio centers and receiving points. But these were lacking in the villages where a majority of the population lived.

The measures adopted by the party and state bodies to develop telephone communications in the nation had changed this for the better by the start of the Great Patriotic War, and this was also true in the Ukraine. New communications

centers had been built and the number of telephones and radio points had increased. For example, in Vinnitsa Oblast in 1940, of the 1,215 rural soviets 1,079 had telephones.¹⁹

The growing threat of war required a further improvement in the mobilization plans. In line with this, the party committees, the soviet bodies and military commissariats of the Ukraine undertook a number of new measures in this area. The republic government in accord with the decree of the Defense Committee under the USSR SNK [Council of People's Commissars] of 18 April 1938 established a clear procedure for approving the mobilization plans. The mobilization plans of the Ukrainian people's commissariats and organizations which were part of the all-Union associations were approved by the appropriate USSR people's commissariats while the mobilization plans of the people's commissariats and organizations which were not part of the all-Union associations were approved by the Ukrainian SNK and were submitted to the Defense Committee under the USSR SNK.²⁰

An improvement in mobilization work was also aided by the decision of the Ukrainian government "On Organizing Mobilization Sectors in the Oblast Planning Commissions" adopted in January 1940. These sectors were to work out plans of mobilization measures following the quotas of the USSR and Ukrainian gosplans.

The republic oblast party committees increased their supervision over the state of mobilization readiness. For example, the Kamenets-Podolskiy party obkom in April 1939 organized an inspection of the mobilization plans in a number of the oblast's rayons and from the results of this on 23 April approved a Decree "On the State of Mobilization Plans in the Rayons." This obliged the secretaries of the party raykoms to take a personal part in working them out and at least once a month to make the required changes in them and to provide for political organizational work during a mobilization. Moreover, the obkom in May 1939 decided to conduct a seminar for the first secretaries of the KP(b)U raykoms on the questions of mobilization work.²¹

The Vinnitsa party obkom on 17 July 1939 sent out a special directive to the KP(b)U raykoms and this provided for the following: the bureaus of the party raykoms were to hear reports on this question by the chairman of the rayispolkoms, they were to repair the warhouses for storing mobilization supplies, they were to stockpile the stipulated mobilization supplies of food, medical and veterinary supplies and "turn the said presidiums of the rayispolkoms" into clearly operating mobilizational bodies. The directive emphasized that the secretaries of the party raykoms were primarily responsible for the state of mobilizational readiness in the rayon.²²

The July (1939) Plenum of the KP(b)U Central Committee gave special attention to the need to increase mobilizational readiness.²³ Soon after the plenum, the state of this in the Ukraine was subjected to a thorough examination by the staffs of the Kiev and Kharkov military districts and by the military sections of the party obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms. The results of the inspection in August were discussed at 10-day meetings for the heads of the military sections of the party committees. Similar conferences were held in Vinnitsa, Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhye, Zhitomir, Stalin (now Donetsk) and Chernigov Oblasts.

The partial mobilization carried out in September 1939 in line with the liberation campaign of the Red Army (chiefly the troops of the Kiev Separate Military District) into the Western Ukraine were a serious testing of the mobilizational readiness of the Ukrainian party committees, their military sections and the military commissariats.

Under their leadership and supervision, reservists were called up, transport was mobilized, military shipments were carried out, hospitals organized and so forth. They organized extensive mass political work among the population. Using all forms of agitation and propaganda, the aims of the liberation campaign and the related tasks were explained. All of this helped greatly in pre-determining its successful implementation.

In carrying out the demands of the VKP(b) Central Committee, the Ukrainian party committees in the prewar years paid even more attention to the questions of mobilizational readiness. Thus, the Stalin KP(b)U obkom at the beginning of 1940 inspected the quality of the mobilization documents at the enterprises and institutions of the oblast center.²⁵ A directive on systematizing the mobilization plans was sent out in the same year to the rayon-level party and soviet bodies by the Odessa party obkom.²⁶ In December 1940, the Kiev KP(b)U obkom conducted a 4-day conference for the heads of the rayon agricultural sections and the MTS directors on the questions of mobilization work.²⁷ In recalling those times, the former Second Secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk Party Obkom, K. S. Grushevoy wrote: "...On the eve of the war we were required to work out mobilization plans strictly and precisely, to determine ahead of time what comrades in the event of necessity would be deferred and remain on the job and which specialists leaving for the army must be immediately replaced and precisely by whom, what contingent of reserve commanders would be sent to the formations being organized in our oblast and which to the formations being organized among our closest neighbors."²⁸

In the spring of 1941, when the immediate threat of a military attack on the USSR had arisen, the Ukrainian party bodies began to work out plans of mobilization measures for the first 3 days of a war. Thus, the Vinnitsa KP(b)U obkom on 18 March recommended that the party raykoms in these plans provide for the following: on the first day to hold an emergency session of the raykom bureau on the question of carrying out the mobilization in the rayon, to send their representatives to the assembly points of the military commissariat, to set up around-the-clock duty for the responsible workers at the raykom and to discuss the course of mobilization over the first day; on the second day to hold a meeting with the leaders of the institutions, enterprises and organizations on the questions of reorganizing work in accord with the wartime requirements, to replace the nomenclature workers of the raykom and other organizations leaving for the army; on the third day to hold meetings with the leaders of the social organizations (Osoaviakhim [Society for Assisting Defense and Aviation-Chemical Construction in the USSR], the Red Cross and trade unions) as well as with the chairman of the rural soviets and kolkhozes on work during the mobilizational period.²⁹

These were the basic areas of activity for the party, soviet and local military administrative bodies of the Ukraine to ensure high readiness for mobilization.

They reflected the concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet government for strengthening the nation's defense capability. And when on 22 June 1941 Nazi Germany suddenly and treacherously attacked the Soviet Union, the experience gained in the prewar years and the work done told favorably on carrying out the set mobilization tasks. In truth, the rapid advance of the Nazi troops who benefited from the surprise factor impeded mobilization in the Western oblasts of the Ukraine. But all the same the reporting of reservists to the induction posts was high. In the Eastern regions of the Ukraine, as throughout the nation, there was a prompt and complete implementation of the mobilization plans.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Vinnitsa Oblast State Archives, folio 489, inv. 1, file 286, sheet 30.

² Ibid., sheet 1.

³ [Not in text]

⁴ Party Archives of the Odessa Obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, folio 9, inv. 1, file 83, sheet 25.

⁵ Odessa Oblast State Archives, folio 2,000, inv. 2, file 19, sheet 27.

⁶ [Not in text]

⁷ Party Archives of the Chernigov Obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, folio 470, inv. 1, file 194, sheet 124.

⁸ [Not in text]

⁹ Party Archives of the Dnepropetrovsk Obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, folio 19, inv. 1, file 4574, sheet 128.

¹⁰ Party Archives of the Zhitomir Obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, folio 85, inv. 7, file 173, sheet 19.

¹¹ See: "Kommunisticheskaya partiya v bor'be za uprocheniye i razvitiye sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva (1937-1941 gg.). Dokumenty i materialy" [The Communist Party in the Struggle to Strengthen and Develop Socialist Society (1937-1941). Documents and Materials], Moscow, Gospolizdat, 1962, p 154.

¹² Central State Archives of the Soviet Army (below TsGASA), folio 25885, inv. 2, file 27, sheet 7.

¹³ Party Archives of the Ternopol Obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, folio 1, inv. 1, file 7, sheet 220.

¹⁴ The estimate was made by the author using materials of the TsGASA (folio 25855, inv. 2, file 27, sheets 21-84).

¹⁵ Party Archives of the Party History Institute under the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party (below PA IIP), folio 7, inv. 12, file 746, sheet 16.

¹⁶ TsGASA, folio 25885, inv. 2, file 39, sheet 537.

¹⁷ Ibid., sheet 532.

¹⁸ See "Vid I i do II Kiyivs'koyi oblastnoyi partiynoyi konferentsiyi," Kiev, 1934, p 98.

¹⁹ Central Party Archives of the Marxism-Leninism Institute under the CPSU Central Committee (below TsPA IML), folio 17, inv. 22, file 2929, sheet 34.

²⁰ TsGASA, folio 25900, inv. 6, file 369, sheet 71.

²¹ TsPA IML, folio 17, inv. 21, file 4977, sheets 62-64.

²² Party Archives of the Vinnitsa Obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, folio 136, inv. 3, file 383, sheet 1.

²³ See: "Kommunisticheskaya partiya Ukrayny v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s"yezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK" [The Communist Party of the Ukraine in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums], Vol 1, Kiev, Politizdat, 1976, p 977.

²⁴ [Not in text]

²⁵ Party Archives of the Donetsk Obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, folio 19, inv. 2, file 1545, sheet 15.

²⁶ Party Archives of the Odessa Obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, folio 11, inv. 8, file 114, sheet 9.

²⁷ Party Archives of the Kiev Obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, folio 5, inv. 1, file 301, sheet 137.

²⁸ K. S. Grushevoy, "Togda, v sorok pervom..." [Then, in Forty-One], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1972, pp 8-9.

²⁹ Party Archives of the Vinnitsa Obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, folio 136, inv. 3, file 390, sheets 9-10.

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DEVELOPMENT OF UNDERWATER DRIVING OF TANKS DESCRIBED

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[Article by Hero of the Soviet Union, Col (Ret) M. Ashik: "From the Experience of Driving Tanks Under Water"]

[Text] Driving under water is a relatively new method for the crossing of a water barrier by a tank, but attempts to drive vehicles fully submerged in the water were undertaken in our nation from the very first years of series tank production. In particular, in 1936, on individual T-26 tanks, experimental models of equipment for underwater driving were installed.¹ This was an air intake pipe mounted on the turret through which air was supplied to the engine of the submerged tank. The engine design made it possible to release the exhaust directly into the water, since the pressure in the exhaust pipe exceeded the water's counterpressure. The sealing of the hull and the turret was provided by a system of gaskets from patches, plugs, and tarred gaskets and so forth. In the process of developing the equipment, the questions of controlling the tank under water were solved, the ways were sought out for protecting the crew against intoxication by exhaust fumes and variations were worked out for evacuating the personnel from a vehicle in trouble as well as for towing a tank which had become stuck on the bottom. In 1940, five Soviet combat vehicles with special equipment for underwater driving manufactured at one of the Leningrad plants crossed the Izhora River under the water.²

However, in prewar years, unfortunately, things did not go any farther than experiments.

Abroad, work was also being done to seek out technical solutions which could ensure the driving of tanks along the bottom of a river. Thus, in 1939, the English A-9 tank was equipped with rigid air-intake and exhaust pipes mounted vertically one against the other.³ The design of such a device did not have any fundamental difference from the design of the air intake pipes used on the Soviet T-26 tanks.

In 1940, in planning the invasion of England, the armored troops of Nazi Germany established four special subunits which received the designations A, B, C and D. These were manned with experienced tank troops. The 130 T-III and T-IV tanks in use by these subunits had equipment which allowed the submerging of the

entire vehicle in the water. This was based on air intake hoses which were kept on the water surface by floating buoys. The intake of air necessary for the operation of the engine occurred only in windless weather. The exhaust was removed through a muffler. For sealing the openings in the tank hulls, insulating material was employed while the clearance between the hull and the turret was filled with a wedge-shaped rubber gasket which was held tight by the external water pressure. The turret and gun were covered with a special rubber mantel which was to be removed with a blasting charge when the tank emerged from the water. The tanks prepared in this manner were to be transported to the English coast on special vessels and at the designated time under the cover of darkness or fog drop down to the sea bottom along an inclined ramp.⁴ The landing operation on the British Isles, as is known, did not come about, but the specially equipped tanks for underwater driving were to be used by the Nazis in the treacherous attack on the USSR. They wanted to use them in crossing the Western Bug and capture a bridgehead on Soviet territory. But the Nazis canceled this operation as their engineer units were able to put up a pontoon bridge in this sector of the frontier. At the end of July 1941, the Soviet troops succeeded in capturing a T-III tank adapted for underwater driving.⁵ It cannot be excluded that this was one of the tanks designed for crossing the bottom of the Western Bug.

In working on new models of tanks in the course of World War II, the German designers did not abandon the attempts to adapt them for underwater driving. Thus, in designing the T-V Panther and T-VI Tiger tanks, they provided for their carrying of equipment for underwater driving. In particular, on the nose of the hull there were telescopic tubes for supplying the engine with air during the submerging of the combat vehicle in the water. The radiators and the fans of the cooling system were moved into separate compartments isolated from the engine compartment and during the crossing of the water barrier these were to be shut off and flooded with outside water. However, all these innovations were not realized in practice. Due to the difficulties arising in the sealing of the hulls of the combat vehicles, the German tank troops were not permitted to employ this equipment in crossing water obstacles.

In August 1942, an attempt to move tanks under water (from a landing vessel to the shore) was made by the Allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, in landing a force at Dieppe. The English Mk-IV infantry tanks were adapted for moving along the sea bottom, having provided a portion of the combat vehicles with equipment looking like elongated shafts and by which air was taken in and exhaust removed. This made it possible to drive the tanks at depths up to 2.6 m. The hatches of the combat vehicles were sealed with a special mastic while the front and the opening for the machine gun were protected against water penetration by rubber aprons glued on the armor and running as far as the turrets.⁶

During the Great Patriotic War the Soviet tank troops repeatedly used deep fords for crossing their tanks over water obstacles. In October 1943, in the course of the battle for the Dnepr, for example, it was necessary to move the 20th Guards Tank Brigade from the V Guards Tank Corps across the river bottom. Regardless of the fact that the depth of the ford was almost twice as deep as the tolerable, the tank troops boldly prepared for the wading of the T-34 tanks across the river. They plugged the turrets and packed their races, while the hatches, louvers and other openings in the hull were covered with packing from

tow with grease and everything was held tight by blocks and wedges.⁹ For supplying air to the engine the men employed corrugated hoses and for removing exhaust fumes, canvas sleeves were fitted to the exhaust pipes. It required from 6 to 8 hours to prepare a tank for traveling under water.⁹

In the course of the crossing, the drivers drove their tanks in first gear along a route designated to two rows of stakes. The cold water penetrated the tanks, rising up to the level of the driver's seat, it got into the engine compartment but the strong fans forced it back.¹⁰ Over a period of 8 hours on 3 October 1983, more than 60 tanks succeeded in wading the river. It took one tank an average of up to 8 minutes to cross the deep ford. Only in three vehicles in traveling under water did the engines die and the tanks have to be pulled out.¹¹

Tanks from the 2d Tank Army made a deep ford crossing in March 1944 in the course of the Uman-Botosani Operation. During the offensive, the tanks of the field force by the end of 11 March had reached the Southern Bug, but due to the blowing up of the bridges by the enemy and the lack of the required crossing equipment, they were unable to cross it without a halt. Then it was decided to assemble improvised materials, build rafts and during the night of 12 March move the motorized rifle battalions of the tank brigades across on them to capture a bridgehead. When this had been done, it was decided that a portion of the tanks would make a deep ford to support the motorized infantry on the bridgehead in the area of Shumilovo and Berezki. The depth of the river at the point of the crossing reached 2 m. The tank troops carefully prepared their vehicles. The hatches and slits were packed with tow, and were filled with clay and grease. The exhaust pipes of the engines were lengthened by specially made canvas hoses and these led to the surface. Seven tanks equipped in this manner crossed the river and entered battle against the Nazis.

Tanks crossing along a deep ford was also employed in other offensive operations. For example, in the Proskurov-Chernovtsy Operation, around 200 tanks from the 1st Tank Army crossed the Dnestr by this method.¹² In the region of Ustechka, where this crossing was made, the river depth approached 2.2 m and the width exceeded 100 m.

But, regardless of a number of examples of the successful crossing of water obstacles, the crossing of tanks under water during the years of the Great Patriotic War for a number of reasons (basically technical) was not widespread. The absence of special regular equipment, the necessity of spending significant time on readying the vehicles for traveling under water and a number of organizational difficulties had a particular negative impact on the broad use of this method in combat practice. The combat experience of the Great Patriotic War convincingly showed that certain types of tanks should have a special device making it possible for the wading of water obstacles. In the postwar period, the crossing of tanks under water has become widespread in the armies of many countries.

FOOTNOTES

¹ "Bronetankovaya tekhnika Sovetskoy Armii" [Armored Equipment of the Soviet Army], an album, Moscow, Izd. Voyennoy akademii bronetankovykh voysk, 1966, pp 49-50.

² "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Moscow, Voyenizdat, Vol 2, 1976, p 277; Vol 6, 1978, pp 289-290.

³ Kenneth Macksey, John H. Batchelor, "Tank. A History of the Armoured Fighting Vehicle," New York, 1971, p 140.

⁴ ARMOR, the United States, January-February 1959, p 42.

⁵ VESTNIK TANKOVY PROMYSHLENNOSTI, Moscow, Mashgiz, No 1, 1944, p 20.

⁶ Ibid., p 18.

⁷ Ibid., No 8-9, 1944, p 40.

⁸ TANKIST, No 5, 1956, p 30.

⁹ P. I. Karpenko, V. S. Lyndin, "Tank pod vodoy" [A Tank Under Water], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1971, pp 10-12.

¹⁰ "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza" [History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union], Vol 3, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1961, p 331.

¹¹ "Sovetskiye tankovyye voyska 1941-1945" [The Soviet Tank Troops in 1941-1945], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1973, p 152.

¹² "Stroitel'stvo i boyevoye primeneniye sovetskikh tankovykh voysk v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Organizational Development and Combat Employment of the Soviet Tank Troops During the Years of the Great Patriotic War], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1973, pp 194-195.

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BOOK REVIEWED ON FALL OF BERLIN

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[Review by Engr-Lt Col S. Sergeyev of the book "Belyye flagi nad Berlinom. Iz bloknota voyennogo korrespondenta" (White Flags Over Berlin. From the Notebook of a War Correspondent), by Ya. Makarenko, 2d Supplemented Edition, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1983, 272 pages]

[Text] The farther we are removed from the events of the unforgettable years of the Great Patriotic War the greater the value of the information of the participants and eyewitnesses of these events left by them for subsequent generations. These are the memoirs of military leaders, descriptions of individual episodes, tales about the combat deeds of the Soviet military and brief entries in notebooks made directly on the battlefield to the roar of the exploding bombs, shells and mines. Over the years the interest of readers has not lessened in this, basically documentary genre of historical literature. On the contrary, the youth are endeavoring to learn about the memoirs of the veteran who with its own eyes saw and took a direct part in the fierce battles to defeat the Nazi Wehrmacht. Precisely in this category of books on the last war is the second, supplemented edition of the collection of frontline essays by the PRAVDA war correspondent Ya. I. Makarenko, "Belyye flagi nad Berlinom" [White Flags Over Berlin] and published by Voyenizdat.

At present, when the threat of a nuclear war is becoming evermore tangible, when there is the obvious shortsightedness and danger of the militaristic course of the Reagan Administration which is endeavoring to secure a dominant position for the United States in the world, the book written about events almost 40 years ago is a warning for everyone fond of military adventures.

The author is not a dispassionate chronicler but rather writes as an active participant of the storming of Berlin. With documentary accuracy he records facts which have now become a matter of history in textbooks and fundamental scientific works. His pen puts down the most valuable thing: the truth about the war and the mortal examples of the legendary heroes of the battles. The great achievement of Ya. Makarenko is that he has succeeded in getting across the dynamics of battle in keeping the flavor of the last days of the Great Patriotic War.

The book includes 53 stories. Some of them are strictly documentary while others gravitate to the form of artistic prose. But they are all characterized by a deep penetration into the essence of the described events and the showing of those seemingly ordinary details of times without which the present generation would find it hard to conceive of the entire greatness and immortal military feat of the Soviet soldier.

At the center of the author's attention are people, soldiers from the most diverse service position, from the private to the marshal. This is the chief merit of the book. The stories written sometimes during brief minutes of a lull upon the editors' assignment, where each material is a complete, independent work of military writing, in being collected together, provide a whole picture of the great battle for Berlin.

Running as a constant theme through all the narration is the subject of the mass heroism of the Soviet troops and this, in the author's expression, became a characteristic subject of the times (p 86). "I feel that such mass heroism as is being shown during these days in the Battle for Berlin," the book quotes Gen N. E. Berzarin, the commander of the 5th Assault Army which stormed the capital of the Nazi Reich, "has never existed before. Yes, yes, believe me, an old soldier..." (p 28).

...The tank of Guards Lt Ivan Gapon was moving forward. The crew was working skillfully and decisively. The Nazis succeeded in hitting the vehicle with a bazooka, but the tank continued to destroy Nazis with fire and tracks. The heroes perished in the burning tank but they did not cease firing for a single minute. Enemy corpses were piled up around the tank, three destroyed guns could be seen as well as several burned-out vehicles (pp 88, 89).

...The bomber of Lt K. Tsarev was over the target of enemy tanks, assault guns and armored personnel carriers. The plane was just about to go into its dive. At that moment, almost simultaneously, the navigator and gunner reported: "Nazi fighters to the rear, to the left and overhead!"

One of the Focke-Wulfs succeeded in hitting the aircraft, it began to smoke and in the cockpit you could smell burning. But the commander decided to carry out the combat mission and aimed the plane at the target. The enemy antiaircraft gunners were covering the positions of their troops with solid fire. After bombing Lt Tsarev discovered that a rudder control was damaged. He refused to bail out because during the dropping of the bombs over the target the navigator had been wounded. A fight began to save the life of his comrades and the aircraft. At an altitude of less than 1,000 m above the ground, the left engine began to fail and the aircraft rapidly began to lose altitude. The covering of the central fuel tank soon thereafter caught fire and could explode at any moment. The flames were inching their way toward the cockpit, the engines had given up but Tsarev continued the flight trying at any cost to get across the front line. Just a score meters above the ground, the lieutenant spotted a suitable landing area and belly-flopped the airplane safely (pp 36-38).

The Soviet soldier is shown in the book as a patriot and internationalist, a good-willed person. "From the very first hours of the battle in Berlin," the author emphasizes, "the peaceful population saw in them the heralds of a new,

socialist world: polite, kind and peaceful. These human qualities of the Soviet soldiers were spotted very quickly by the residents of Berlin and very highly praised" (pp 66-67).

The frontline stories of Ya. I. Makarenko are read now as combat reports which have come down to us from the battlefields. For example, one cannot remain indifferent in reading the detailed and moving story of how the courageous soldiers Mikhail Yegorov and Meliton Kantariya, who subsequently were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union, under enemy fire raised the banner of victory over the dome of the Nazi Reichstag. With the force of the word, the author has captured this legendary feat, providing an opportunity for everyone --both the veterans and the representatives of the younger generation--to draw closer to it and to imagine all the troubles of the unprecedented ascent of two Soviet soldiers along the fiery path from the foot of the gloomy Nazi citadel to its very peak, to glory, to the joy and happiness of victory.

The book by Ya. I. Makarenko provides substantial aid to those who are endeavoring to study more profoundly the history of the Great Patriotic War and trace in detail the difficult path of our army to victory. Such details are not imaginary but are taken from life itself as the reader will find in the book "Belyye flagi nad Berlinom." As has been rightly pointed out in the foreword to the book by the well-known Soviet writer, Yu. Zhukov, "such details are not thought up. They were captured by the war reporter, as they say, hot on the trail, and the reader must say a great word of thanks for having done this" (p 7).

In positively reviewing the book as a whole, we would like to point out a number of things to those who prepared the second edition. This involves primarily the inaccuracy of the statistical data given by the author on a quantitative analysis of the balance of forces in the Berlin Operation. In considering that the book to a significant degree is designed for a generation born after the Great Patriotic War or soon after its conclusion, it should have been provided with the necessary reference information.

As a whole, we must again emphasize that the book "Belyye flagi nad Berlinom" is of great cognitive and indoctrinal importance. It will be read with interest by both veterans and young soldiers.

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COURSE OUTLINE FOR STUDY OF FINAL PERIOD OF WORLD WAR II

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[Course material on military history written up by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Docent, Col P. Bobylev: "The Complete Expulsion of the Enemy from the Soviet Union. The Liberation of the Peoples of Europe and the Final Defeat of Nazi Germany (January 1944-May 1945)"]

[Text] The study of the given subject is aimed at making the officer candidates fully aware of the place and role of the most important operations conducted by the Soviet Armed Forces during the third period of the war as well as the questions of the development during this period of the tactics of their Armed Service (branch of troops). The standard curriculum on military history assigns 4 hours for a lecture on the given subject and 2 hours for a seminar.

In the lecture it is recommended that the following questions be examined:

1. The offensive of the Soviet Armed Forces during the winter and spring of 1944.
2. The expulsion of the Nazi invaders from Soviet land and the liberation of the peoples of Southeast Europe during the summer and autumn of 1944.
3. The defeat of the Nazi troops during the course of the winter-spring offensive by the Soviet Army in 1945.
4. The Berlin Operation and the end of the war in Europe.

For a more ordered and accessible exposition of the lecture content, it is advisable during the first 2 hours to examine military operations in 1944 and then in the final 2 hours the concluding victories of the Soviet Armed Forces in Europe. In each 2-hour exercise it is desirable to assign 10-15 minutes for an introduction, a conclusion and answers of the students and to distribute the remaining time approximately equally for the questions of the lecture, paying chief attention here to bringing out the most important features and results of the major operations and to examining the basic aspects in the development of tactics.

For the lecture it is essential to employ the diagram "A Review of Military Operations During the Third Period of the Great Patriotic War"; in describing the appropriate questions it is also useful to employ diagrams or film strips about the major operations.

At the start of the first exercise in a brief introduction it is important to emphasize the timeliness of the studied subject. In the first place, it is devoted to events the 40th anniversary of which will be widely celebrated in our nation. The great historical feat of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces serves as a reminder for today's defenders of the motherland of their personal responsibility for its security and of the need for high vigilance and combat readiness under the conditions of the sharply aggravated international situation caused by the U.S. imperialists. At the same time, the results of the operations in 1944-1945 are a warning to those figures in the West who have not drawn the proper lessons from the experience of the last war and are hatching plans for a "Crusade" and for new aggression against the USSR and its allies. Secondly, the combat experience gained in these operations has largely maintained its importance at present and helps the military personnel in correctly resolving important questions of present-day military art. Thirdly, the study of the subject provides an opportunity to conduct an active offensive struggle against the bourgeois falsifiers who are endeavoring to play down the crucial importance of military operations on the Soviet-German Front and spread the myth of the main role of the second front opened by the Allies in 1944 in the victory over Germany.

The offensive of the Soviet Armed Forces during the winter and spring of 1944. The exposition of the question must commence with an analysis of the strategic situation which had developed by January 1944. Here it is important to emphasize that the Soviet-German Front continued to remain the main front of World War II. More than 90 percent of the divisions of the German Army and those of Germany's European allies were fighting against the Soviet Army. Having concentrated virtually all the forces of the Wehrmacht in the East, the Nazi leadership was planning to stabilize the situation on this front by a strategic defense.

The Soviet Command intended in 1944 to conduct a series of major offensive operations along the entire strategic front in the aim of expelling the Nazi invaders from the USSR and together with the Allies to liberate the peoples of the European countries from the yoke of Nazism.

It is advisable to begin the review of military operations in the winter of 1944 with the Leningrad-Novgorod Operation (14 January-1 March) in the course of which the Soviet troops advanced 220-280 km to the west. The most important result of the operation was the final elimination of the blockade of Leningrad.

The basic portion of time on the first question must be devoted to describing the offensive of the Soviet troops on the Right Bank Ukraine, one of the major strategic operations during the years of the war. In the course of it in almost 4 months, 10 operations of fronts and groups of fronts were carried out and these were interconnected by a unified plan.

The result of the first two operations--the Zhitomir-Berdichev by the troops of the First Ukrainian Front (24 December 1943-14 January 1944) and the Kirovograd by the Second Ukrainian Front (5-16 January 1944) was the envelopment on the north and south of the major enemy grouping in the area of Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy.

In the next Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy Operation (24 January-17 February 1944) the troops of the designated fronts encircled eight enemy divisions, one brigade and many separate units. Here the Nazis lost 55,000 men killed and more than 18,000 prisoners. On the external perimeter of encirclement, 15 Wehrmacht divisions were defeated, including 8 tank ones.² The Soviet troops now had an opportunity to develop the offensive toward the Southern Bug and Dnestr.

At the same time as the Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy Operation, the Rovno-Lutsk Operation was being conducted by the troops on the right wing of the First Ukrainian Front (27 January-11 February 1944) and the Nikopol-Krivoy Rog Operation by the Third and Fourth Ukrainian Fronts (30 January-29 February 1944). In the course of the first of these, an advantageous line was taken for striking into the flank and rear of the Army Group South. The result of the second operation was the defeat of 12 enemy divisions, the elimination of the Nikopol enemy bridgehead and the creation of favorable conditions for liberating the Crimea.

In the Proskurov-Chernovtsy Operation (4 March-17 April 1944), the troops of the First Ukrainian Front defeated 20 enemy divisions and having advanced 80-350 km, reached the foothills of the Carpathians. Thus, they split the enemy strategic front. In achieving success a major role was played by the bold and rapid actions of the individual tank and mechanized units and subunits of the Soviet troops which broke through into the enemy rear and disrupted its retreat. As an example, the instructor could give the actions of the reconnaissance group consisting of the tank platoon of Lt P. I. Barabanov and the submachine gunner platoon of Lt M. Ya. Radugin (the 4th Tank Army). This group during a week-long raid from the area of Kamenets-Podolskiy through the enemy rear (27 March-2 April) destroyed 10 tanks, 8 armored personnel carriers, 24 guns, hundreds of motor vehicles and a large number of Nazi soldiers and linked up with the advancing Soviet troops. Lts P. I. Barabanov and M. Ya. Radugin were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The Second Ukrainian Front successfully conducted the Uman-Botosani Operation (5 March-17 April 1944) as a result of which 10 enemy divisions lost 50-75 percent of the personnel while the Soviet troops advanced 200-250 km and on 26 March 1944 crossed the state frontier of the USSR with Romania.

Other combat operations in the south were also of great importance. In the Bereznegovoye-Snigirevka Operation (6-18 March) the troops of the Third Ukrainian Front under the conditions of the spring mud advanced up to 140 km and created a good situation for conducting the Odessa Operation which commenced on 26 March and ended on 14 April. As a result Odessa and a significant portion of Moldavia were liberated. The Second Belorussian Front in the Poles'ye Operation (15 March-4 April 1944) defeated 12 enemy divisions, it secured on the north the offensive by the troops of the First Ukrainian Front and created good conditions for continuing the offensive on the Brest and Lublin axes.

Our successes on the Right Bank Ukraine put the enemy 17th Army in the Crimea in a difficult position. Its defeat and the liberation of the Crimea was entrusted by Headquarters to the Fourth Ukrainian Front and the Separate Maritime Army which were aided by the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Naval Flotilla. Here it is wise to make the following comparison: the main naval base of the Black Sea Fleet, Sevastopol was liberated by Soviet troops in just 5 days while the Nazis in 1941-1942 spent 250 days to capture the city.

In summing up this question, it is essential to point out that in the winter and spring of 1944, the Soviet troops defeated 172 enemy divisions and 7 enemy brigades. The Nazis lost over a million soldiers and officers, 8,400 tanks and assault guns and around 5,000 aircraft.¹ The Soviet troops had reached the state frontier with Poland and Czechoslovakia, they had entered Romania and had assumed a good strategic position for conducting new offensive operations.

The expulsion of the Nazi invaders from Soviet land and the liberation of the peoples of Southeast Europe during the summer and autumn of 1944. Initially it is essential to emphasize that the victories won by the Soviet Army showed its increased capability and capacity not only to expel the Nazi invaders from Soviet territory but also to complete the defeat of Nazi Germany. For precisely this reason, the ruling circles of the United States and Great Britain were forced to abandon the policy of delaying the start of extensive combat operations in Europe. On 6 June 1944, the Anglo-American Expeditionary Forces landed in Northern France, thereby opening (with a delay of at least 2 years) of a second front. But even after this undoubtedly important event, the Soviet-German Front continued to remain the crucial front of World War II with almost three-quarters of the best battleworthy formations of the Wehrmacht and the European allies of Germany.

The plan of the Soviet Command for the summer-autumn campaign was aimed at completing the expulsion of the occupiers from all Soviet territory and beginning to liberate the European peoples from the Nazi yoke. In the campaign the main thrust was to be made at the center of the Soviet-German Front in the aim of defeating the Army Groups Center and Northern Ukraine which were on the defensive in Belorussia and the Western oblasts of the Ukraine. This would bring the Soviet troops by the shortest route to the frontiers of Nazi Germany and, in addition, would split the enemy forces fighting on the northwestern and southern sectors.

In the course of the Vyborg Operation (10-20 June 1944) and the following Svirsk-Petrozavodsk (21 June-9 August 1944) Operation, the troops of the Leningrad and Karelian Fronts in cooperation with the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, the Ladoga and Onega Military Flotillas, defeated large enemy groupings and advanced 110-130 km up the Karelian Isthmus and 110-250 km into Southern Karelia, thereby creating prerequisites for putting Finland out of the war and for liberating the Soviet Arctic.

In taking up this question of the lecture, basic attention must be given to the main thrust of the Soviet troops in the zone from Polotsk to the Carpathian foothills. The Belorussian Operation commenced in 23 June and involved the First Baltic, the Third, Second and First Belorussian Fronts, and on 13 July, the Lwow-Sandomierz Operation of the First Ukrainian Front. The outcome of the fighting at the center of the Soviet-German Front had an enormous impact on the further course of the war. The two strongest Nazi army groups, Center and Northern Ukraine, had suffered a catastrophic defeat. Some 26 enemy divisions were completely destroyed and 82 lost 60-70 percent of their strength. Just in the course of the Belorussian Operation, the Wehrmacht lost around a half million soldiers and officers killed, wounded and captured.² The Soviet troops had reached the frontier with East Prussia and the Vistula. The possibility was created of conducting further operations in East Prussia and fully liberating

Poland. The Nazi Command was forced to shift 28 divisions from the Army Groups Southern Ukraine and North to the central sector.

In the course of the Belorussian and Lwow-Sandomierz Operations, the Soviet military again demonstrated their high moral and combat qualities. (Briefly take up the feats of Pvt Yu. A. Smirnov, Pfc G. P. Kunavin, the tank crews of Lts A. V. Dodonov and P. N. Rak and the pilot, Col A.I. Pokryshkin.)

The result of the Iasi-Kishinev Operation (20-29 August) was the complete defeat of the Army Group Southern Ukraine, the destruction of 22 German divisions and the routing of almost all the Romanian divisions which were on the front.⁵ Royal Romania dropped out of the war on the side of Germany and on 24 August declared war on Germany. The enemy defenses on the southern wing of the Soviet-German Front had collapsed. The Soviet Army together with the Romanian and Bulgarian formations and units which had turned their weapons against the Nazis as well as the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak troops in the autumn of 1944 liberated Romania, Bulgaria, the eastern part of Yugoslavia and significant Hungarian territory and had invaded Czechoslovak territory.

In the course of the Baltic Operation (14 September-24 November 1944) conducted by the troops of the Leningrad, the Third, Second and First Baltic Fronts and by a portion of forces from the Third Baltic Front and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, the Soviet troops cut off the enemy grouping in Kurland from East Prussia. Three Wehrmacht divisions were sealed off in the area of Memel (Klaypeda). All the remaining territory of the Soviet Baltic had been liberated of occupiers.

In the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation of the Karelian Front and the Northern Fleet (7-29 October), Soviet troops under the difficult conditions of the Far North advanced up to 150 km, they liberated Petsamo Oblast and provided aid to the Norwegian people in liberation from the Nazi occupiers.

In the conclusion of the first lecture, it is essential to sum up the offensives of the Soviet Armed Forces in the summer and autumn of 1944. The Soviet Army had expelled the enemy from all Soviet territory (with the exception of Kurland) and with the participation of forces from the national liberation movement and regular troops from a number of countries had liberated Romania, Bulgaria, and a part of the territory of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Norway. Under its blows the Nazi bloc had collapsed with the allies of Nazi Germany in Europe declaring war on it. All the Wehrmacht army groups including North, Center, Northern Ukraine and Southern Ukraine fighting on the Soviet-German Front had suffered severe defeats or had been routed. The enemy had lost 1.6 million soldiers and officers, including more than 860,000 who were permanently lost.⁶

During the operations of the 1944 summer-autumn campaign, Soviet military art underwent further development. One might note the increased depth of the missions for the units and formations, a broadening of the width of the zone of advance, the establishing of artillery groups according to tactical-organizational features (PAG [regimental artillery group], DAG [divisional artillery group] and KAG [corps artillery group]), the improved cooperation between tanks and infantry, the employment of a double rolling barrage for breaking through the enemy defenses and so forth.

At the start of the second exercise as an introduction to the lecture, it must be emphasized that during the concluding campaign the Soviet troops won outstanding victories, as a result of which Nazi Germany surrendered.

The defeat of the Nazi troops in the course of the winter-spring offensive by the Soviet Army in 1945. The exposition of this question must be started by describing the situation as of January 1945. In comparison with the previous year, the line of the Soviet-German Front had been shortened from 4,400 to 2,200 km, but almost two-thirds of all the divisions of the ground forces of Nazi Germany and its satellites remained here.⁷ By the start of 1945, the Soviet troops had occupied an advantageous strategic position.

The Soviet Army was confronted with an historic task of completing the defeat of Nazi Germany and together with the armies of the Allies in the anti-Hitler coalition to force the enemy into unconditional surrender. In the coming campaign this goal was to be achieved by conducting large offensive operations simultaneously on all strategic sectors.

According to the plan of Hq SHC, during the first stage of military operations the Soviet troops, in making the main thrust on the central sector, were to defeat the enemy in Poland, East Prussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Austria. In the course of the second stage of the offensive, they were to capture Berlin, liberate Prague, link up with the Allies and conclude the war in Europe. As for the plans of the Nazi leadership, it was endeavoring to extend the war, to defer its collapse, hoping on a split in the anti-Hitler coalition. The basic Wehrmacht forces, as before, were concentrated in the East in the aim of preventing the advance of Soviet troops deep into Germany.

The attention of the students should be drawn to the fact that the operations of the Soviet Army commenced 8 days earlier than the planned date. The shifting of the start of the offensive from 20 January to an earlier date was caused by a request from the Allies due to the severe situation which they had fallen into as a result of the Nazi offensive in the Ardennes and in the area of Strasbourg. The powerful blows of the Soviet troops forced the Nazis not only to break off the offensive in the West, but also to shift significant forces from there, including the 6th SF Tank Army to the East. Thus, the USSR again set an example of the honest fulfillment of Allied obligations.

The basic portion of the time must be given to describing the Vistula-Oder and East Prussian strategic operations.

The Vistula-Oder Operation (12 January-3 February 1945) was carried out by the troops of the First Belorussian and First Ukrainian Fronts with aid from the left wing of the Second Belorussian Front and the right wing of the Fourth Ukrainian Front. Over the 23 days of the operation, Soviet troops, advancing in a zone over 500 km wide, pushed to a depth of 500 km, having destroyed 35 enemy divisions and defeated 25. They liberated a significant part of Poland with its capital of Warsaw and entered German territory. Favorable conditions were created for further strikes against the enemy in Pomerania, Silesia and on the Berlin axis, where just 60 km remained from the captured Kustrin bridgehead on the Oder to the capital of the Nazi Reich. Together with the Soviet Army, men from the 1st Polish Army were fighting successfully.

In the East Prussian Operation (13 January-25 April) conducted by the troops of the Second and Third Belorussian Fronts and a portion of the forces from the First Baltic Front with assistance from the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, the missions were carried out of breaking through the strongly fortified enemy defenses under conditions of fierce resistance. Here the battles were extended and heavy. The operation lasted 103 days and ended with the complete defeat of the Nazi grouping and with the capture of East Prussia and the northern regions of Poland.

In the review of the other operations from this stage of the offensive, it is essential to point out that on 13 February the enemy grouping surrounded in Budapest was eliminated and at the same time the entire Budapest Operation ended. From 10 February through 4 April, the troops of the First and Second Belorussian Fronts with aid from a portion of the forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet carried out the East Pomeranian Operation in the aim of eliminating the threat of a flank attack against the Soviet troops advancing on the Berlin axis. Of important significance were the Lower Silesian (8-24 February) and Upper Silesian (15-31 March) Operations of the First Ukrainian Front. As a result of these the threat of a flanking strike by the enemy from Upper Silesia was prevented. The troops of the Second, Third and Fourth Ukrainian Fronts successfully carried out the tasks of defeating the enemy in the south and liberating Hungary as well as a portion of the territory of Czechoslovakia, Austria and the southern regions of Poland.

The Berlin Operation and the end of the war in Europe. On this question the basic amount of time must be devoted to the Berlin Operation (16 April-8 May) which held a special place in the 1945 campaign. This operation involved troops from the First and Second Belorussian Fronts, the First Ukrainian Front, a portion of the forces from the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, the 18th Air Army, the long-range aviation and National Air Defense Troops as well as the Dnepr Military Flotilla (in operational terms under the First Belorussian Front).

In endeavoring to hold Berlin, the Nazi Command brought up the basic Wehrmacht forces against the Soviet troops and actually exposed the front in the West. The Nazis were ready to surrender their capital to the Anglo-American troops, counting on the possibility of concluding a separate peace with them. It must be pointed out that the political and military leaders of the United States and England themselves wanted to take Berlin before the Soviet Army, hoping on receiving the laurels of the main creators of victory over Nazism. However, all these plans were unrealistic. The Soviet Army quickly prepared and conducted the Berlin Operation.

According to the plan of the Soviet Command, the troops of the three fronts by powerful strikes on several sectors were to break through the enemy defenses along the Oder and Neisse, to develop the offensive in depth and encircle the basic grouping of Nazi troops in the Berlin sector with the simultaneous splitting of them into several parts and their subsequent elimination.

The time allocated for the last question of the lecture makes it possible for the instructor to give a brief description for each stage in the Berlin Operation. During the first stage (16-19 April) the Soviet troops crushed the powerful, deeply echeloned defenses which were full of antitank devices. In the

course of the second stage of the operation (19-25 April), they reached directly the outskirts of Berlin, they split the enemy grouping and encircled the Nazi troops in the forest to the southeast of the capital of the Reich (24 April) and in Berlin itself (25 April). On the last day in this stage of the operation, Soviet troops met up with the forward units of the American army in the region of Torgau (on the Elbe).

The content in the third stage of the operation (26 April-8 May) was the defeat of both surrounded groupings (numbering 200,000 men each), the capturing of Berlin and the reaching of the Elbe. On 8 May, representatives of the Wehrmacht signed the Act of Unconditional Surrender of Nazi Germany. In taking up this stage, the heroism of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Berlin must be emphasized.

In the course of the Berlin Operation, the troops from the three Soviet fronts defeated 70 enemy infantry divisions, 23 tank and motorized ones as well as a large portion of its aviation, they captured up to 11,000 guns and mortars, more than 1,500 tanks and assault guns and 4,500 aircraft.⁹ The operation made a significant contribution to the treasurehouse of Soviet military art: the decisive massing of men and weapons on the sectors of the main thrusts, the creation of the highest artillery densities during all the war years, the deep echeloning of battle formations, the conducting of artillery softening up and the going over to the offensive at night, the brief (7 days) time for eliminating surrounded groupings, the setting up of assault detachments, assault groups and artillery destruction groups and the use of a significant portion of the artillery for firing with direct laying.

The third question must be completed by a brief description of the Prague Operation conducted by the troops of the First, Fourth and Second Ukrainian Fronts on 6-11 May. The Soviet troops provided fraternal aid to the insurgent Czechoslovak people, they liberated Prague and defeated and captured the Nazi grouping in Czechoslovakia.

In conclusion it is wise to sum up the results of the concluding campaign by the Soviet troops in Europe. In the course of the continuous offensive, the Soviet troops fought their way over 800 km, they completed the liberation of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, they liberated a portion of Austria and freed the German people of the Nazi yoke. Some 98 enemy divisions were destroyed and 56 were taken prisoner, while 93 enemy divisions laid down their arms with the Act of Unconditional Surrender; the enemy lost over 1 million men on the Soviet-German Front in killed alone.⁹

Under the leadership of the Communist Party, the Soviet people and their Armed Forces blocked the way to world domination by fascism and played the decisive role in the victory over Nazi Germany.

During the concluding campaign of the Soviet troops, as in the 1944 operations, high examples of military art and heroic and bold actions by the subunits and units of the various branches of troops were shown. In pointing out the characteristic traits of tactics of the Soviet troops, it is wise to particularly mention: the further improvement in the methods for organizing the breakthrough of enemy defenses saturated with antitank equipment (the Berlin Operation) as well as the breaking through of fortified areas (East Prussia); the

instructive organization of pursuing the enemy at a high pace and to great depth (Vistula-Oder); the skillful maintaining of cooperation between infantry, tanks, artillery and aviation in the course of all combat; the rich experience of combat operations for large cities (Budapest, Vienna, Poznan, Danzig, Konigsberg, Berlin and others); the skillful crossing of numerous water barriers (particularly the Oder and Neisse); the creation of powerful defenses in a short period of time (at Lake Balaton). This experience has largely not lost its importance under present-day conditions, too. Undoubtedly, in the conclusions on military art, one must pay attention first of all to those which are timely from the viewpoint of the professional training of the officer candidates in the given school.

At the end of the lecture, instructions must be given on preparations for the seminar. The standard curriculum is oriented at studying for this subject the development of tactics in offensive combat in the engagements of 1944 and the particular features of combat in the taking of Berlin. Precisely these questions should be discussed at the seminar, having adjusted their content without fail for the specialty of the officer candidates and having recommended the corresponding literature for their study. During the hours of independent work, for reinforcing the lecture's material and in the aim of preparing for the seminar, it is advisable to show the officer candidates the documentary training film "Combat Operations of the Soviet Troops in the Operations of 1944-1945."

FOOTNOTES

- 1 "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Vovenizdat, Vol 12, 1983, p 217.
- 2 Ibid., Vol 8, 1977, pp 73, 75.
- 3 Ibid., p 467.
- 4 Ibid., Vol 9, 1978, p 74; "Sovetskiy Soyuz v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945" [The Soviet Union During the Years of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Moscow, Nauka, 1976, p 478.
- 5 "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Moscow, Vovenizdat, Vol 8, 1980, p 676.
- 6 "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...," Vol 9, p 531.
- 7 Ibid., Vol 10, 1979, p 217.
- 8 Ibid., Vol 10, p 344.
- 9 Ibid., p 501.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF ANDREY SERGEYEVICH BUBNOV GIVEN

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 84 (signed to press 24 Feb 84) pp 90-93

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col S. Gusarevich: "A Prominent Revolutionary and Historical Writer (on the Centennial of the Birthday of A. S. Bubnov)"]

[Text] The path of a professional revolutionary is a difficult and dangerous one. But precisely this way was chosen by Andrey Sergeyevich Bubnov while still a student.¹ In 1903, he joined the ranks of the RSDRP [Russian Social Democratic Revolutionary Party] and dedicated his entire life to the struggle for the liberating of the working class from the suppression of capital. Neither prisons where he spent almost 5 years nor constant persecution by the Tsarist Secret Police could break the will of the young revolutionary.

During the years of the first Russian revolution, A. S. Bubnov became one of the leaders of anti-governmental actions by workers in Ivanovo-Voznesensk. As the representative of the Bolsheviks in that city, A. S. Bubnov was a delegate at the 4th (United) and 5th RSDRP Congresses. A personal meeting with V. I. Lenin and participation in the work of the party congresses had a significant impact on his ideological and theoretical growth. At the 6th (Prague) All-Russian RSDRP Conference in 1912 he was elected a candidate member of the party Central Committee.

From the very outset of World War I, A. S. Bubnov held a consistent internationalist position, defending fundamental Leninist theses on the questions of war, peace and revolution.

The ebullient energy of A. S. Bubnov and an uncommon talent as a party organizer became particularly apparent in the preparations for the Great October Socialist Revolution. At the 6th Party Congress he was elected a member of the Central Committee. On 15 October 1917, Andrey Sergeyevich gave a report at the closed session of the St. Petersburg Bolshevik Party Committee and which resolved practical questions related to the armed overthrow of the Provisional Government. Having pointed to the necessity of improving the ties of the center with the outlying areas and the outlying areas in turn with the plant committees, the speaker emphasized that the situation required bringing the Red Guard to combat readiness.

At an expanded session of the Central Committee held on 16 October, a resolution was adopted urging all organizations and all workers and peasants to prepare intensely for armed revolt. Then from among the Central Committee members a Military-Revolutionary Center was elected and this was to be a party body for direct leadership of the revolt. Its members included: A. S. Bubnov, F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, Ya. M. Sverdlov, I. V. Stalin and M. S. Uritskiy. The Military-Revolutionary Center comprised the leading corps of the Military-Revolutionary Committee (VRK) which was set up during those days under the Petrograd Soviet. The activities of the VRK were completely directed by the Bolshevik Party Central Committee headed by V. I. Lenin. In preparing for the revolt, A. S. Bubnov was entrusted with leadership over the seizing of the railroad stations and the establishing of control over the railroads.

After the victory of Great October, the party sent Andrey Sergeevich Bubnov to the Ukraine. He participated in suppressing the Kaledin rebels and in the fight to strengthen Soviet power in the Don and after the 7th (Emergency) Party Congress he was sent back to the Ukraine. Under exceptionally difficult military-political conditions, and in being in various areas of party, soviet and military work, A. S. Bubnov during the period from March 1918 through September 1920 constantly rallied the workers around the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)], he organized the fight, including a partisan one, against the Imperial German occupiers and their bourgeois nationalist supporters and was engaged in organizing the Ukrainian Soviet divisions. In carrying out the demands of V. I. Lenin and the decisions of the 8th Party Congress, he waged an irreconcilable struggle against manifestations of partisanship and a lack of discipline in the troops, he frequently visited the combat areas and participated in analyzing operations.

Being a member of the Ukrainian Defense Council and the revolutionary-military councils of the Ukrainian Front and the 14th Army, A. S. Bubnov made a substantial contribution to strengthening troop defense capability and to developing the system of party political work in the Red Army. He demanded that the political workers be constantly in the thick of the masses, that they conduct indoctrinational work specifically and purposefully and make each Red Armyman aware of the party's tasks. In one of the orders of the RVS [Revolutionary-Military Council] of the 14th Army it states about political work: "Here there is no room for a formal attitude toward the job. Here one must not set oneself apart by official meetings on general subjects. Here there must be group conversations in benefiting from daily occurrences to come into contact with comrades in the company. And the strength of the weapons redoubled by an aware understanding of one's tasks in the hands of the Red Armymen will crush the White Guard bands."

A. S. Bubnov carried out extensive work to implement the Leninist policy of establishing in the summer of 1919 a military-political union of Soviet republics to rebuff the domestic and external counterrevolution. His reports and speeches during this period were marked by depth and objectivity in assessing the military-political situation.

In March 1921, like many delegates to the 10th Party Congress, A. S. Bubnov as a rank-and-file fighter participated in eliminating the Kronstadt Revolt. In the order of the RVSR [Revolutionary-Military Council of the Republic] on

awarding the Order of the Red Banner to him it stated that he, "in participating in the storming of the forts and the Kronstadt Fortress, by personal bravery and example inspired the Red soldiers thereby contributing to the final clearing of the counterrevolutionary bands out of Kronstadt."⁴

In being a member of the RVS of the Northern Caucasus Military District and the 1st Horse Army from April 1921 through May 1922, A. S. Bubnov made a substantial contribution to the organizing and establishing of the district, and to defeating banditry in the Northern Caucasus. He aided in every possible way in strengthening the ties of the Red Army with the working population and in converting the troops to peacetime standing.

At the 12th Party Congress, A. S. Bubnov was elected a candidate member of the Central Committee and at the 13th and subsequent congresses, a member of the party Central Committee. In 1922-1923, he worked as the head of the Agitation and Propaganda Section, from 1924, he was a member of the Central Committee Orgburo [Organizational Bureau], and from 1925, secretary of the RKP(b) Central Committee.

During the most crucial period of the struggle against the Trotskyites, on the questions of military organizational development, the party Central Committee put A. S. Bubnov at the head of the Red Army Political Directorate. He held this position from the beginning of 1924 through September 1929, while simultaneously sitting on the USSR RVS and being the editor-in-chief of the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. He made a substantial contribution to unmasking the anti-Leninist views on the questions of Soviet Military-Organizational development and here showed himself to be a person of great civilian courage and high party principledness.

A. S. Bubnov was a co-worker and follower of M. V. Frunze in carrying out the military reform. In his activities during this time a major place was held by the struggle for the greatest possible rise in the leading role of the Communist Party in Soviet military organizational development. "We," he wrote, "have seen to it that in the Red Army the leading political role is completely and fully in the hands of the working class in its vanguard, the Communist Party."⁵ With the active involvement of A. S. Bubnov, a great deal was done to strengthen the political bodies and party organizations of the Army and Navy. He became the initiator of carrying out in 1925 and 1928 the first and second all-Army conferences for party cell secretaries and he gave speeches at these. Thus, a beginning was made to the glorious tradition of convening a forum of the Army and Navy communists.

A vivid description from this period of the activities of A. S. Bubnov was given on the occasion of his 50th anniversary in the greetings from the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs and the RVSR: "In carrying out unity of command, in introducing iron military, revolutionary discipline, in strengthening the political apparatus and the party and Komsomol organizations of the Red Army, in the area of Bolshevik indoctrination of the Red Armymen and the command personnel and, finally, in the area of elaborating the basic questions of military construction in light of Marxist-Leninist theory--you hold a merited, honored place."⁶

From 1929 A. S. Bubnov became the RSFSR people's commissar of education.

Andrey Sergeyevich was the author of more than 200 printed works. He was one of the major researchers on our party's history and for a number of years was a member of the Scientific Council of the Marx-Lenin Institute and the Presidium of the Socialist Academy. He wrote major general works on CPSU history: "Osnovnyye momenty v razvitiu kommunisticheskoy partii v Rossii" [Basic Moments in the Development of the Communist Party in Russia] (1921), "Osnovnyye voprosy istorii RKP(b)" [Basic Questions in RKP(b) History] (1924) and the monograph article "The VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] in the 1st Edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia.

The value of the party history works by A. S. Bubnov is not only in the great concrete historical material assembled in them but also that the author has endeavored to disclose the pattern of party development and generalize all its diverse activities and has fought against subjectivism in party history science. At present, much to the point are his words from a comment to the article "The VKP(b)": "...In the course of laying out ideas and facts of VKP(b) history, we inevitably have incorporated elements of party 'contemporary times.' Here we have proceeded from the view that a proletarian revolutionary and member of the Leninist party who has taken up the pen of a historian cannot be the 'objective' reviewer of party history but must also be an active fighter for Leninism against all and any distortions of the revolutionary theory of Marx--Engels--Lenin."⁷

A. S. Bubnov played a marked role in establishing Soviet military history science. He was the chairman of the Higher Military Editorial Council which was engaged in publishing literature on military theory and history. He was the chairman of the commission to convene the 1st Congress of the Military Scientific Society, the chairman of the organizational commission for preparing the publication of the Soviet Military Encyclopedia and a member of the editorial board of the journals VOYNA I REVOLYUTSIYA [War and Revolution] and VOYENNYY VESTNIK [Military Herald]. When, in 1929, a section for studying the problems of war was established under the Communist Academy, A. S. Bubnov headed its presidium.

The numerous articles, speeches and reports by Andrey Sergeyevich Bubnov from those times convincingly show what great importance he gave to developing military history as a science and to establishing a Marxist-Leninist methodology in it. Here particular attention was given to the activities of V. I. Lenin in preparing and carrying out the Great October Socialist Revolution, and to defining the principles for the organizational development of the Red Army and organizing the defeat of the formations of the domestic and external counterrevolution during the years of the Civil War.

A. S. Bubnov penned the article "Lenin on Clausewitz" which provides a brief, but very thorough analysis of the comments of Lenin on the well-known work of this German bourgeois military historian and theoretician "On War."⁸ In emphasizing the important methodological significance of Lenin's notes and his comments for the study of war as a social phenomenon, the author convincingly showed that they are not a simple outline of the designated work. V. I. Lenin concentrated chief attention on the thesis in the teachings of Clausewitz on

the relationship of war to politics, on the employment of the dialectics of war to politics and on elucidating the nature of war as the continuation of politics by other means.

A whole series of articles by A. S. Bubnov is devoted to the military activities of the Communist Party. In the foreword to the collection of documents "VKP(b) i voyennoye delo" [The VKP(b) and Military Affairs], he, in analyzing the basic party documents on military questions, convincingly disclosed the leading role of the party in all areas of Soviet military organizational development and emphasized that, starting with the first Russian revolution of 1905-1907, military affairs "had become part of the party tasks and securely hold a definite place in the party."⁹

A. S. Bubnov made a major contribution to studying the history of the Civil War and the military intervention in the USSR. With his participation, the three-volume scientific work "Grazhdanskaya voyna 1918-1921 gg." [The Civil War of 1918-1921] was written. For its time this was a major general study. Nor has it lost its importance for military historians now. In the foreword written for the three-volume work, A. S. Bubnov, in relying on Lenin's works, has given a definition for the essence of civil war, he disclosed its causes and main driving forces, he brought out the basic sources for the historic victory of the Soviet workers and showed the organizing and inspiring role of the Communist Party headed by V. I. Lenin to direct the entire course of the armed struggle. In drawing attention to the value of the experience of the Civil War from the viewpoint of the further development of Soviet military art, he wrote: "...This war has provided examples of operations of exceptional maneuverability in combining the combat of regular armies with the direct armed class struggle of various groups of the population both in the rear and in the zone of the front."¹⁰

For Soviet military history of definite interest are the works of A. S. Bubnov devoted to the outstanding military leader and theoretician Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze.¹¹ He accurately spotted the distinguishing traits of M. V. Frunze as a new type of military organizer, a politician and military specialist who brilliantly was able to apply the ideological heritage of V. I. Lenin in military affairs.

Over his complex and great life, A. S. Bubnov made certain mistakes. In March 1918 he sided with the "leftist" communists, in 1920-1921 with the group of "democratic centralism" and in 1923 (briefly) with the Trotskyite opposition. Regardless of the extremely acute nature of the struggle against various opposition groups, the Central Committee strictly adhered to the standards established in the party and showed tolerance for honest communists who had gone astray, employing the method of persuasion. The party and V. I. Lenin sharply criticized A. S. Bubnov. The principled, just criticism helped him correct his mistakes and to subsequently fight steadfastly for carrying out the party general line.

In the memory of the Soviet people, A. S. Bubnov remains as a professional Bolshevik revolutionary, a Soviet party, state and military figure, a talented historical writer and an indefatigable propagandist of Marxist-Leninist ideas.

FOOTNOTES

¹ A. S. Bubnov (1884-1940) was born in Ivanovo-Voznesensk (see: A. Rodin, "On Clarifications in the Biography of A. S. Bubnov," VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 4, 1979, p 74). He completed secondary school and studied in the Moscow Agricultural Institute but was expelled for revolutionary activities.

² "Protokoly Tsentral'nogo Komiteta RSDRP(b). Avgust 1917--fevral' 1918" [Protocols of the RSDRP(b) Central Committee. August 1917-February 1918], Moscow, Politizdat, 1958, p 104.

³ A. M. Rodin, "Voyenno-politicheskaya deyatel'nost' A. S. Bubnova (1917-1929 gg.)" [The Military-Political Activities of A. S. Bubnov (1917-1929)], Dissertation Resume for the Academic Degree of Candidate of Historical Sciences, Moscow, Izd. VPA imeni V. I. Lenin, 1981, p 11.

⁴ Order of the RVSR, No 93 of 21 March 1921.

⁵ A. Bubnov, "Grazhdanskaya voyna, partiya i voyennoye delo" [The Civil War, the Party and Military Affairs], Moscow, Voyenny vestnik, 1928, p 77.

⁶ PRAVDA, 6 April 1933.

⁷ "Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya" [The Great Soviet Encyclopedia], 1st Edition, Vol II, Moscow, 1930. Note to the Article "The VKP(b)."

⁸ PRAVDA, 21 January 1930.

⁹ A. S. Bubnov, "O Krasnoy Armii" [On the Red Army], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1958, p 38.

¹⁰ Ibid., p 223.

¹¹ See: A. Bubnov, "Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze," 2d, Supplemented Edition, Moscow-Leningrad, OGIZ, 1931; also "O Krasnoy Armii," pp 55-116.

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